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ABSTRACT
Whether the danger invoked is nuclear war or genetically modified foods, far more people in some
countries than in others say they are afraid. Using data from six surveys, I show that the levels of reported
fear of different dangers correlate strongly across both individuals and countries. I construct indexes
of fearfulness for 15-25 countries and map the prevalence of fear in Western Europe. About two thirds
of the crossnational variation within Europe can be explained by differences in pessimism—the degree
to which respondents exaggerate the likelihood of disasters. Among the countries for which I have
data, the most robust correlates of fearfulness relate to countries‘ religious traditions. Fear tends to
be higher in countries where more people believe in Hell and where fewer believe in Heaven.
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In some countries, people are more fearful than in others. Whether the object of fear is nuclear war, 
epidemics, or serious medical errors, survey respondents in Portugal are two to three times as likely 
as those in the Netherlands to say they are afraid. More than 80 percent of Greeks report worrying 
about the spread of weapons of mass destruction, genetically modified foods, and new viruses; in 
each case, fewer than 50 percent of Finns say the same.  
  In this paper, I show that predispositions to fear vary systematically across countries, and 
map the geography of fearfulness, concentrating on Europe for which data are most plentiful. I show 
that  variation  in  fearfulness  is  correlated  with—but  only  partly  explained  by—variation  in 
pessimism (overestimation of the probability of unpleasant outcomes). I examine some hypotheses 
about why fear might vary across countries, and determine to what extent they are consistent with 
the observed patterns. Although the data do not permit strong conclusions, I conjecture that aspects 
of countries‘ religious traditions predispose countries to higher or lower levels of fear.    
    Of course, some countries are more dangerous than others. Their inhabitants might be more 
afraid simply because they have more to be afraid of. This, I argue, can explain only a small part of 
the  variation.  Some  dangers—world  war,  nuclear  conflict—are  inherently  global  in  scope,  and 
variation in fear of these is both large and correlated with fear of other threats. For certain dangers 
one can compare levels of fear to objective measures of the risk. I show that the correlations between 
these are often weak, non-existent, or even negative. For instance, fear of contracting swine flu in 
2009 tended to be lower in countries where the infection rate was higher.  
  Another  possibility  is  that  what  varies  across  countries  is  not  fear  itself  but  just  the 
willingness  to  admit  it.  In  some  cultures,  expressing  emotions  is  discouraged,  especially  in  the 
presence of strangers. Where men are expected to be more ―macho,‖ fewer might confess to being 
afraid. That respondents might tailor their answers to comply with social norms is quite possible. 
But I show that it is precisely in countries with more ―masculine‖ cultures that more respondents—
both male and female—express fear. Reports of fear are also more—not less—common in countries 
with cultures that most strongly discourage the open expression of emotions.    2 
 
  Understanding why people are more afraid in some countries than in others is important for 
several reasons. Economists have noted substantial crossnational differences in reported happiness 
and life satisfaction (e.g. Deaton 2008). Although national income helps to account for this variation, 
part remains unexplained (Stevenson and Wolfers  2008). In a companion paper, I show that—at 
least within Europe, for which data are available—individuals who are more fearful tend to be less 
satisfied with their lives. Countries where the average level of fear is higher tend to have lower 
average happiness, even controlling for national income. It is hard to prove a causal relationship. 
Still, it is reasonable to suppose that if the level of fear in some countries were to fall, this would 
improve their average level of subjective wellbeing.  
  Fear is also thought to be related to various other social, political, and economic phenomena. 
Greater fear of nuclear war has been found to correlate with a lower savings rate (Slemrod 1986), 
and, in general, fearfulness may reduce the motivation to plan ahead and invest. Some have linked 
fear of crime to poorer health (Ross 1993). In politics, various scholars argue that fear predisposes 
people to more conservative attitudes or aggressive behavior (Bar-Tal 2001). Some conjecture that 
fear  induces  individuals  to  favor—or  at  least  accept—more  authoritarian  government,  in  Erich 
Fromm‘s  phrase  to  ―escape  from  freedom‖  (Fromm  1941,  Feldman  and  Stenner  1997).  In  the 
companion  paper  already  mentioned,  I  examine  the  strength  of  empirical  relationships  between 
countries‘ average levels of fear and such purported consequences. 
  While the study of emotions and moods—most notably, happiness—has flourished recently in 
economics,  empirical  work  on  the  geographical  prevalence  of  emotions  is  less  common.  A  major 
exception is Moïsi (2009), who characterizes the continents on the basis of particular emotions which 
he sees as locally dominant—for Asia, hope; for the Middle East, humiliation; and for the West, fear. 
The evidence I provide, although far from definitive, suggests that fear is not higher in the West 
than in other parts of the world and that variation within continents is at least as significant as 
variation  across  them.  Scholars  have  studied  the  geographical  distribution  of  cultures,  usually 
identified  with  particular  syndromes  of  values  (Hofstede  2001,  Inglehart  and  Wlezen  2005).  I 
examine here to what extent the value systems detected in such work  correlate with fearfulness.  3 
 
  I also briefly explore the relationship between fear and trust. Many scholars have noted large 
differences  across  countries  in  how  much  confidence  individuals  have  in  their  national  political 
institutions and how ready they are to trust others. It seems plausible that trust and fear would be 
related. Fear might cause people to be more distrustful, and distrust might make people fearful. I 
show  that,  in  fact,  across  individuals—either  within  countries  or  groups  of  countries—the 
correlations  between  measures  of  trust  and  measures  of  fear  are  very  weak.  Across  countries, 
average levels of fear and trust are more highly correlated. However, they do not appear to be merely 
noisy measures of the same underlying phenomenon. Factor analysis conducted on trust and fear 
questions together—whether at the individual or country level—identifies two distinct factors, one 
highly correlated with trust and one highly correlated with fear, both of which explain a significant 
proportion of the variation.   
  The next section discusses the concept of fear and offers a simple formalization. Section 3 
reviews the patterns of fear evident in survey data and devises indexes of fearfulness. Section 4 
assesses the validity of the data. Section 5 devises a crossnational index of pessimism and shows 
that  this  can  explain  about  two  thirds  of  the  variance  in  fearfulness.  Section  6  explores  the 
relationship  between  measures  of  fear  and  measures  of  trust.  Section  7  examines  possible 
explanations for why some countries have higher levels of fear. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2   The concept of fear 
Many  scholars—in  philosophy,  psychology,  sociology,  and  political  science—have  considered  the 
nature and causes of fear, and there is insufficient space here to  adequately review their work.1 
Instead, I provide only the background necessary to orient the subsequent analysis of crossnational 
differences. 
Fear is an intense, unpleasant emotional reaction to perceived danger (e.g., Öhman 2008, 
p.710). Most scholars consider it to be one of six or seven ―basic emotions‖ that are thought to be 
                                                           
1 Recent surveys include Svendsen (2008), Tudor (2003), Lewis et al. (2008), Gullone (2000), and Robin (2000). 4 
 
found in all human communities, each of which comes with a characteristic facial expression (Ekman 
et al. 1982).2 A range of animals also exhibit signs of fear (e.g. Gray 1987). It is thought to confer 
evolutionary  advantage,  preparing  organisms  to  flee  or  defend  themselves  when  threatened.  In 
humans  and  some  other  mammals,  fear  is  associated  with  distinctive  physiological  responses, 
including  activation  of  the  autonomic  nervous  and  endocrine  systems,  increased  heart  rate,  and 
activity in the amygdala (LeDoux 2000).  
While the word fear usually denotes a response to a particular stimulus (fear of spiders, of 
nuclear war, etc.), the related concept of anxiety refers to a mood of foreboding not focused on any 
concrete danger (Öhman 2008, p.710).3 Of course, an anxious mood may predispose individuals to 
feel  more  intense  fear  of  specific  threats.  As  I  will  show,  fears  tend  to  correlate  strongly  across 
individuals  and  countries,  consistent  with  the  idea  that  an  underlying  predisposition—
―fearfulness‖—influences reactions to danger. In some cases, the surveys I use ask respondents how 
―worried‖ they are about a given danger. I treat ―worried‖ and ―afraid‖ as being close to synonyms, 
although worrying is usually understood as less intense.  
  Fear can be a response to an observed threat in the immediate environment—a bear in one‘s 
path, an explosion above one‘s head—but it can also focus on a danger not currently present—a 
planned visit to the dentist, a nuclear war. In such cases, the stimulus is a mental image. One might 
think that the intensity of the fear experienced would vary with the expected disutility of the feared 
event—that is, the probability of its occurrence multiplied by the disutility if it occurs. However, 
psychological research suggests a more complicated process. 
  There  are  thought  to  be  two  pathways  to  fear—one  innate  or  pre-conditioned  and 
subconscious,  the  other  involving  conscious  information  processing.  The  subconscious  ―low  road‖ 
involves  the  rapid  passage  of  signals  from  the  sensory  organs  via  the  sensory  thalamus  to  the 
amygdala, bypassing regions of the brain cortex associated with conscious thought (LeDoux 2000, 
                                                           
 
2 Besides fear, the emotions usually considered to be ―basic‖ are happiness or joy, sadness or distress, anger, 
surprise, and disgust.   
   
3 Similar emotion-mood pairs include joy-happiness, distress-sadness, irritation-anger. 5 
 
pp.174-5).  The  amygdala  immediately  activates  arousal  systems  that  boost  output  of  stress 
hormones, stimulate the autonomic nervous system, and fire up those brain regions that consciously 
analyze information.  
The second pathway involves the conscious processing of danger signals in the brain cortex. 
Such cognition may either dampen or amplify fear generated subconsciously. While the probability 
and aversiveness of the feared event are important, research suggests that people  do not simply 
multiply the objective probability by the disutility, as in expected utility theory (Lowenstein et al. 
2001).  For  one  thing,  individuals  must  first  form  subjective  estimates  of  the  probability.  Such 
estimations  turn  out  to  be  sensitive  not  just  to  (accurate)  remembered  information,  but  also  to 
erroneous beliefs, mood, and any fear the individual is already feeling. People who are in a bad mood 
or  afraid  tend  to  be  more  pessimistic  (Johnson  and  Tversky  1983,  Lerner  and  Keltner  2000). 
Estimates  of  risk  may  also  depend  on  how  the  relevant  information  was  acquired—personal 
experience  is  overweighted  relative  to  information  absorbed  from  indirect  sources  (Weber  2010). 
Evaluating the aversiveness of the feared outcome is also not straightforward. Previously acquired 
beliefs and values obviously matter. But, in addition, situational details such as how vividly the 
outcome is described or imagined affect how unpleasant it seems (Lowenstein et al. 2001, pp.275).  
Finally,  even  given  an  evaluation  of  how  probable  and  undesirable  an  event  is,  other 
factors—some universal, some culturally specific, and some individual—influence how much fear it 
evokes. At the universal end of the scale, dangers that are perceived to be imminent generate more 
fear (Lowenstein et al. 2001, pp.278). So do dangers that are relatively new and unfamiliar, and 
those  over  which  the  individual  feels  a  greater  lack  of  control  (Slovic  1987).  Different  cultures 
condition people to have stronger or weaker emotional reactions to particular dangers (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982). At the individual end, the same people may feel more or less fear of a given danger 
when in different moods.  6 
 
  Figure  1  shows  a  simple  representation  of  the  fear-generating  process  that  attempts  to 
capture  various  linkages  suggested  by  psychological  research. 4 Algebraically,  we  can  define  the 
amount of fear, F, that a given individual feels when considering an unpleasant possible event, x, as: 
  ( , , ), ( ), F f p m b u b m             (1) 
where   is the intensity of the subconsciously generated fear response prompted by the image of x, u 
is the disutility the individual expects to experience if x occurs, b is a vector of the individual‘s beliefs 
and values,  () p   is the individual‘s subjective probability of  x, m is a measure of the individual‘s 













Individual characteristics and social influences may affect the production of fear at multiple 
points. Genetic differences help to determine the intensity with which the amygdalas of different 
individuals  react  to  flying  bullets  or  deafening  noises,  and  also  their  susceptibility  to  different 
                                                           
4 This is meant to summarize current psychological thinking about fear (for another, similar view, see the flow 
charts in Lowenstein et al (2001)). One could no doubt complicate the diagram with even more arrows and 
feedbacks. The ―affect heuristic‖ of Finucane et al. (2000) suggests that both the perceived probability and 
disutility are determined by the (here omitted) variable ―affect,‖ which measures how good or bad the imagined 





























moods.5 Such  genetic  factors  may—or  may  not—sum  to  differences  across  national  populations. 
Culture  is  also  bound  to  matter.  Conditioning  in  a  variety  of  social  settings—families,  churches, 
schools,  enterprises,  political  organizations—determines  the  set  of  beliefs  and  values  that 
individuals  bring  to  bear  in  the  cognitive  analysis  of  dangers,  and  social  experiences  affect  the 
prevalence of different moods. Media messages influence values and beliefs. Finally, conditioning in 
social settings trains the amygdala to respond more or less intensely to particular stimuli.  
 
3   Mapping fear 
I  analyze  data  from  six  surveys.  Three  were  conducted  by  the  Eurobarometer  team,  which  polls 
representative samples of citizens of EU countries twice a year, predominantly on attitudes towards 
the  European  Union.  On  three  occasions—November-December  2000;  March-May  2002;  and 
September-October  2005—the  questionnaires  included  a  number  of  questions  on  fears  of  various 
dangers.  The  2000  and  2002  surveys  (EB2000  and  EB2002)  included  exactly  the  same  set  of 
questions. Specifically, respondents were told: ―Here is a list of things that some people say they are 
afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not. 1. A world war. 2. 
A  nuclear  conflict  in  Europe.  3.  A  conventional  war  in  Europe  (not  nuclear,  bacteriological,  or 
chemical). 4. The accidental launch of a nuclear missile. 5. An accident in a nuclear power station. 6. 
Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. 7. Ethnic conflicts in 
Europe. 8. Terrorism. 9. Organised crime. 10. Epidemics.‖ For each of these, respondents could reply 
―afraid,‖ ―not afraid,‖ or ―don‘t know.‖  
  The 2005 survey (EB2005) asked about certain food-related dangers. Respondents were told: 
―For each of the following issues, please tell me if you are very worried, fairly  worried, not very 
worried or not at all worried by it.‖  Eleven dangers were then listed.  Since many of these were 
similar—for instance, ―pollutants like mercury or dioxin‖ and ―pesticide residues in fruit, vegetables, 
or cereals‖—I chose to focus on a subset of four that were more distinct: ―1. The so called mad cow 
                                                           
5 A variety of research suggests a genetic component in fearfulness (e.g. Marks 1986; Montag et al. 2008).  8 
 
disease (BSE);  2. Genetically modified products in food or drinks; 3. To put on weight; and 4. New 
viruses  like  avian  influenza.‖  Later  the  questionnaire  turned  to  medical  care,  and  asked 
respondents:  ―All  in  all,  how  worried  are  you  to  suffer  a  serious  medical  error?‖  As  before, 
respondents could pick from: ―very worried,‖ ―fairly worried,‖ ―not very worried,‖ ―not at all worried,‖ 
or ―don‘t know.‖ 
  A  fourth  survey,  the  ―Asia  Europe  Survey:  A  Multinational  Comparative  Study  in  18 
Countries‖ (ASES), conducted in 2001 by Takashi Inoguchi of Chuo University, polled representative 
samples of respondents in nine European and nine Asian countries on a variety of topics.6 Included 
in the questionnaire was the question: ―Some people feel that their life is going well. Others are 
worried about the way it is going. In your own case, how worried are you about each of the following? 
1. Your work situation. 2. Your health. 3. Your family life. 4. Your neighborhood. 5. Your country. 6. 
The international situation generally.‖ Respondents could select ―very worried,‖ ―somewhat worried,‖ 
―not worried at all,‖ and ―don‘t know.‖ Another, partly overlapping question later asked: ―Now, when 
thinking specifically about the situation in [respondent‘s country], how worried are you about each of 
the  following?  A)  The  economy.  B)  Political  corruption.  C)  Problems  of  human  rights.  D) 
Unemployment.  E)  The  level  of  crime.  F)  The  quality  of  the  public  services.  G)  The  level  of 
immigration. H) Ethnic conflict. I) Religious conflict. J) The condition of the environment.‖ Possible 
answers were the same as before.  
  Finally, the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) conducts annual surveys of the residents of 
a  number  of  countries,  on  themes  that  vary  from  year  to  year.7 The  Spring  2009  survey  asked 
respondents in 25 countries if they had heard of the disease known as ―swine flu,‖8 and then asked 
those who had heard of the illness: ―How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be 
                                                           
6 The Eurobarometer and ASES survey data were downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For full reference details, see Table A1 in the appendix. In each case, the 
original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the funding agencies bear no responsibility for my interpretations or 
inferences.  
 
7 Data downloaded from the Pew Global Attitudes Project website at http://pewglobal.org/category/data-sets/.  
 
8 More than 90 percent had heard of swine flu in most countries, the four exceptions being Pakistan (16 
percent), India (69 percent), Nigeria (61 percent), and Kenya (75 percent).  9 
 
exposed  to  swine  flu?‖  Respondents  could  answer  ―very  worried,‖  ―somewhat  worried,‖  ―not  too 
worried,‖ ―not at all worried,‖ ―already exposed,‖ or ―don‘t know.‖ In the 2006 Pew poll, an almost 
identical question was asked about the bird flu, which was then a major health issue. In another 
question in 2006, those who said they had heard about global warming were asked: ―How much do 
you personally worry about global warming – a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or not at all?‖  
These surveys have different advantages and disadvantages. EB2000 and EB2002 covered 
just the 15 Western European countries that were then EU members. EB2005 added the 10 new EU 
members (five from Eastern Europe, three Baltic states, plus the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus 
and Malta).  ASES combined  nine Western European and nine Asian countries.  Finally, the  Pew 
Surveys of 2006 and 2009 included, respectively, 15 and 25 countries from around the world. EB2000 
and EB2002 contained the most usefully framed battery of questions. Their repetition of exactly the 
same questions makes it possible to check the consistency of answers and to look for change between 
the two dates (a period that included the 2001 9/11 terrorist attack). Surveys differed in how fine-
grained  a  set  of  options  they  allowed  respondents.  Whereas  EB2000  and  EB2002  offered  only 
―afraid‖ and ―not afraid‖ (as well as ―don‘t know‖), the other three surveys let respondents provide 
more detail about the intensity of their fear. However, these three used the word ―worried‖ rather 
than ―afraid.‖ The types of dangers invoked also varied across the surveys. In EB2000 and EB2002, 
war and other disasters predominated, while in EB2005 there was greater focus on food and health 
issues. For these reasons, with the exception of EB2000 and EB2002, one cannot examine change in 
the level of fear over time.  
Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents in each country that said they were afraid of or 
worried about each of the main dangers investigated, excluding those who said they did not know or 
refused  to  answer,  and  using  sampling  weights  when  these  were  available.  (As  shown,  all  the 
surveys had low rates of ―don‘t know‖ or ―refused to answer‖.)  
Several  observations  immediately  suggest  themselves.  First,  there  are  clear  geographical 
patterns. Within Western Europe, the southern, Mediterranean countries—Greece, Portugal, Spain    10 
 
Table 1:   The geography of fear (percentage of respondents “afraid of” or “worried about” the following dangers) 
















































                                  W. Europe 
               
 
           
 
                                  Portugal  76  74  82  80  81  87  88  87  82  71  51  58  45  76  52  56 
Greece  67  63  89  83  75  86  90  79  79  69  67  82  53  81  71  71 
Cyprus                      56  77  64  83  53  67 
Malta                      48  59  71  84  44  61 
Spain  66  62  79  71  76  89  76  75  74  65  55  58  51  58  37  52 
Luxembourg  44  51  81  62  62  76  83  53  64  51  47  67  50  69  48  56 
Italy  39  36  80  59  72  82  88  52  64  55  71  79  63  85  67  73 
France  35  32  79  68  73  81  74  67  64  50  59  68  50  74  40  58 
Germany   50  51  78  66  62  68  79  55  63  52  51  63  38  64  30  49 
UK  51  52  71  69  61  73  72  58  63  59  39  55  49  57  33  47 
Ireland  46  51  76  64  61  68  78  57  63  50  39  53  43  57  32  45 
Sweden  39  38  76  64  74  71  83  52  62  37  17  46  40  48  13  33 
Belgium  36  33  70  54  64  76  81  50  58  41  51  53  50  62  39  51 
Denmark  37  33  73  56  69  62  73  35  55  40  41  56  48  54  30  46 
Austria 
40  44  85  52  52  53  63  39  53  34  49  71  40  57  21  48 
Netherlands  25  22  64  49  70  69  75  42  52  27  34  43  42  53  20  38 
Finland  28  28  73  36  48  54  73  52  49  31  30  47  49  47  24  39 
    All W.E.*                      47  60  49  64  37  51 
                                  E. Europe 
               
 
           
 
                                  Poland 
               
 
 
72  78  42  83  54  66 
Slovenia 
               
 
 
56  70  45  66  40  55 
Hungary 
               
 
 
57  65  40  75  38  55 
Slovakia 
               
 
 
45  55  47  68  43  52 
Czech Rep. 
               
 
 
55  53  47  66  34  51 
    All  E.E. *                      56  63  44  71  40       55 
                                  Former Soviet 
               
 
 
           
                                  Lithuania 
               
 
 
70  70  45  76  74  67 
Latvia 
               
 
 
66  73  45  76  65  65 
Estonia 
               
 
 
46  55  38  65  30  47 
    All Baltic                      61  66  42  72  56       60 
                                 
% DK or NA  2  3  2  4  4  3  2  4  3  3  1  4  1  2  2  2 11 
 
Table 1: Continued 
  ------------------------------Asia Europe Survey (ASES)---------------------------
--- 
------Pew Global Attitudes Surveys-----
- 
  --------------------------------------2001--------------------------------------  -2009-  ----------------2006------------ 
 

















                        W. Europe 
                                              Greece  78  89  86  71  94  91  85 
        Spain  67  73  69  50  80  83  70  53  57  86  65 
Portugal  55  69  56  31  78  71  60 
        Italy  52  48  39  25  56  86  51 
        Germany  51  68  42  29  58  85  55  27  33  64  41 
France  43  36  26  18  48  81  42  35  34  86  52 
UK  37  38  29  36  64  72  46  28  30  68  42 
Sweden  33  35  22  24  43  71  38 
        Ireland  27  39  29  27  39  49  35 
            All W.E.  49  55  44  35  62  77  54  36       
                        E. Europe 
                                              Poland 
             
39 
      Turkey 
             
47  37  75  53 
                        Former Soviet 
                                              Russia 
             
77  81  66  75 
                        Asia 
                                              Philippines  89  86  88  84  95  91  89 
        South Korea 
KoreaKorKore
a 
81  89  86  74  88  80  83  68 
      Japan  80  82  69  54  89  96  78  60  68  93  74 
China  68  62  54  26  60  60  55  45  59  62  55 
Taiwan  65  54  55  58  81  77  65 
        Thailand  64  49  43  24  71  66  53 
        Indonesia  58  35  51  32  84  64  54  77  87  77  80 
Malaysia  51  65  51  33  64  67  55 
        Singapore  42  54  47  29  37  47  43 
        India 
             
77  81  87  82 
Pakistan 
             
66  78  59  68 
    All Asia   67  64  61  46  74  72       64  60       
                        Americas 
                                              Brazil 
             
65 
      Mexico 
             
64 
      Argentina 
             
61 
      USA 
             
29  44  53  42 
Canada                23       
                        Middle East 
                                              Jordan 
             
71  76  66  71 
Egypt 
             
69  82  77  76 
Lebanon 
             
54 
         Pal. Terrs. 
             
51 
      Israel 
             
43 
                              Africa 
                                              Nigeria 
             
74  80  80  78 
Kenya 
             
63 
      % DK or NA   4  1  1  2  2  7  3  0.5  0-2  0-8   
Sources: see Table A1 in appendix. Percentages calculated with sampling weights where available (all except 
ASES), excluding don‘t knows and no answers. *East Germany included in East European—but not  West 
European—total. 12 
 
and  Italy—tend  to  be  the  most  fearful.  If  we  rank  countries  on  the  frequency  of  reported  fear, 
Portugal and Greece are in the top three for all eight of the dangers from EB2000 shown here, and 
Spain is in the top three for six. In EB2005, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus are the leaders, sometimes 
joined  by  Malta  and  France.  The  former  communist  countries,  included  in  this  survey,  appear 
somewhat more afraid  than the Western European ones on average—although not of putting on 
weight, which seems to be a characteristically Western concern. Among the European countries in 
the ASES survey, Greece is always at the top and Spain and Portugal generally round out the top 
three. At the other end of the scale, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, and sometimes Denmark and 
Sweden tend to be among the most fearless in all surveys.9 
Second, to characterize continents by referring to a single dominant emotion (à la Moïsi) 
seems a little too simple. Each survey shows a striking range of levels of fear across countries within 
the same continent. Indeed, the range within each continent is often greater than the difference in 
averages across them. Judging by these data, it would not be accurate to describe Europe as the 
continent of fear and Asia as the continent of hope. A larger proportion of Asians than Europeans 
confessed  to  worrying  about  their  work,  health,  family,  neighborhood,  and  country  on  the  ASES 
survey. Only on the international situation did European worriers take the lead. China was, as Moïsi 
supposed, less fearful than some of its neighbors; but the Asian country where respondents were 
least afraid was actually Singapore, which often beat the West European average. On the 2009 Pew 
Survey, 60 percent of the Asians surveyed said they were worried about exposure to the swine flu (32 
percent ―very worried‖), compared to 36 percent of West Europeans (13 percent ―very worried‖). This 
was  so  despite  the  fact  that  almost  no  cases  of  swine  flu  had  been  reported  in  Asia,  whereas 
thousands had in Europe. 
 
                                                           
9 The use of identical questions in EB2000 and EB2002 makes it possible to examine change during this period. 
As  Table  A2  in  the  appendix  shows,  more  fears  declined  between  December  2000  and  March  2002  than 
increased. In almost all countries, the proportion afraid of nuclear accidents, ethnic conflict,  epidemics, and 
organized  crime  decreased.  As  one  might  expect  given  that  9/11  fell  within  the  period,  fear  of  terrorism 
increased on average, but only slightly. Increases in West Germany and Italy were offset by a fall in Northern 
Ireland, where the peace process continued to reduce violence.  
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Table 2:   Crossnational correlations between percentages of respondents who were afraid of particular dangers 
  --------------------------------EB2000--------------------------------  EB02  -------------------EB2005------------------  ---------------Asia-Europe Survey----------------  -----Pew---- 












































Nuclear conflict  .97 
                                         
Nuclear accident  .60  .64 
                                       
Proliferation  .85  .81  .56 
                                     
Ethnic conflict  .51  .36  .19  .70 
                                   
Terrorism  .64  .54  .31  .77  .83 
                                 
Org. crime  .46  .39  .31  .54  .62  .70 
                               
Epidemics  .83  .76  .50  .78  .57  .78  .55 
                             
World War 02  .90  .86  .58  .89  .56  .80  .56  .85 
                           
Mad cow disease  .41  .34  .58  .44  .32  .57  .35  .41  .61 
                         
Gen. mod. foods  .36  .35  .81  .44  .16  .36  .30  .28  .52  .84 
                       
Put on weight  .07  -.02  .18  .10  .24  .49  .41  .22  .38  .23  .28 
                     
New viruses  .45  .40  .61  .59  .49  .69  .64  .53  .68  .81  .77  .49 
                   
Medical errors  .52  .46  .57  .56  .44  .70  .71  .56  .74  .83  .75  .41  .83 
                 
Work   .66  .52  .81  .66  .55  .77  .48  .66  .75  .70  .66  .42  .57  .69 
               
Health  .81  .74  .77  .72  .40  .57  .50  .67  .76  .53  .48  .11  .42  .55  .82 
             
Family   .81  .72  .80  .76  .49  .71  .49  .74  .81  .57  .52  .30  .44  .64  .91  .91 
           
Neighborhood  .67  .62  .61  .71  .23  .49  .32  .54  .67  .35  .41  .24  .20  .48  .79  .78  .88 
         
Country  .85  .75  .65  .83  .49  .74  .39  .78  .89  .51  .46  .32  .43  .61  .87  .69  .84  .79 
       
International  .14  -.03  .53  .25  .38  .52  .28  .21  .32  .64  .70  .46  .54  .50  .61  .56  .49  .56  .63 
     
Swine flu  .61  .43  .51  .82  .88  .94  .06  .95  .69  .42  .04  .49  -.01  .36  .70  .27  .71  .55  .84  -.09 
   
Bird flu   .75  .60  .51  .75  .77  .84  .24  .86  .74  .43  -.22  .41  -.33  .36  .69  .13  .68  .37  .78  -.22  .95 
 
Global warming  .00  -.20  .56  .63  .97  .93  -.23  .93  .23  .71  .32  .76  .35  .95  .39  .21  .38  .52  .49  .64  .31  .17 
Sources: see appendix.  
Note: Correlation coefficients; in italics if fewer than six countries available in both series.  
   14 
 
Table 3:   Relationships between fears of different dangers among individuals (odds 
ratios from logistic regressions including country dummies), Eurobarometer 2000 
       Dependent variable: afraid of… 
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Sources: see appendix.  
Note: calculated with sampling weights, controlling for country. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by country. Figures estimate the number of times greater the odds are that a given individual will be 
afraid of the dependent variable if he is afraid of the independent variable. For instance, controlling for country, 
individuals who were afraid of nuclear conflict had odds of being afraid of  world war 43.1 times as high as the 
odds for individuals who were not afraid of nuclear conflict.   
 
Third, related to the previous points, Table 1 reveals considerable consistency in the level of 
fear across different perceived dangers. In countries where many respondents were afraid of one 
danger,  many  tended  to  be  afraid  of  other  dangers  as  well.  Table  2  shows  the  cross-country 
correlations between the percentages of respondents that expressed fear of particular dangers. In 
many cases, the correlations are very high. In almost all cases, the correlations are positive, and the 
vast majority are greater than r = .40. Naturally, fears of dangers that are closely related—such as 
world war and nuclear conflict—are the most highly correlated. But fear of world war also correlates 
at greater than r = .80 with more mundane items such as worry about one‘s family and one‘s health. 
As one might expect, the fear of putting on weight was less closely associated with the other fears, 
but even it correlated at a r > .40 with fear of terrorism and organized crime and worry about new 
viruses,  medical  errors,  swine  flu,  bird  flu,  global  warming,  the  international  situation,  and  the 
respondent‘s work situation.  15 
 
  Such consistency is also visible at the individual level. Table 3, using EB2000 data, shows 
how the odds of a given respondent being afraid of one danger went up if that individual was known 
to be afraid of another danger. The numbers are odds ratios calculated using logistic regressions that 
controlled  for  country.  Respondents  who  were  afraid  of  one  danger  were  very  significantly  and 
substantially more likely to be afraid of others. For example, the odds of being afraid of terrorism 
were 26.4 times as high for those who were afraid of organized crime as for those who were not. 
  This consistency of patterns in the data suggests it is reasonable to posit a common element 
in  these  various  fears—an  underlying  predisposition,  which  I  will  call  ―fearfulness‖—that  varies 
across individuals and countries. One common measure of how closely related different statistics are 
is Cronbach‘s alpha. Cronbach‘s alpha, calculated for the answers of individual respondents, was 
generally high for the different fears included in each survey (.88 for EB2000, .89 for EB2002, .89 for 
ASES, with measures of alpha for individual countries ranging between .78 and .95 in these three 
surveys). The internal consistency of the five fear measures in the EB2005 was a little lower (.70, 
with  alpha  for  individual  countries  ranging  from  .57  to  .78).  Calculated  for  the  percentages  of 
respondents afraid of different dangers in the various countries, alpha was higher, ranging from .89 
for EB2005 to .96 for EB2002.   
For each of the Eurobarometer surveys and for the Europe-Asia survey, I constructed an 
index of fearfulness using all the available questions.10 This index is simply the standardized value 
of the first principal component, calculated from the individual-level data. Since the responses to the 
questions  about  fear  are  all  ordinal  (in  the  first  two  case,  dichotomous),  I  used  the  polychoric 
correlation matrix in the analysis, as recommended by Kolenikov and Angeles (2004). In each case, 
the first principal component accounted for a reasonably high proportion of the variance—from 51 to 
                                                           
10 For 2000 and 2002, I used the questions about fear of world war, nuclear conflict in Europe, conventional war 
in Europe, the accidental launch of a nuclear missile, an accident at a nuclear power station, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, terrorism, organized crime, and epidemics. For 2005: fear of mad 
cow disease, genetically modified food, putting on weight, new viruses such as avian flu, and medical errors. For 
the Europe-Asia Survey: worry about work, health, family, the neighborhood, the respondent‘s country, the 
international situation, and, with reference to the respondent‘s country, worry about the economy, 
unemployment, the level of crime, the quality of public services, the level of immigration, ethnic conflict, 
religious conflict, and the condition of the environment. (I did not use worry about political corruption or 
problems of human rights as missing data would have required dropping China.) In the PEW surveys, there 
were too few questions about fear to extract an underlying dimension.   16 
 
72 percent for the three Eurobarometer surveys, and 46 percent for the Europe-Asia survey, which 
included a larger number of more varied questions.  
The distribution of the fear index thus derived was reasonably close to Normal for EB2005 
(see Appendix for graphs of the distributions). However, for EB2000 and EB2002, many observations 
were bunched at the upper limit, with a smaller but still disproportionate weight at the lower limit. 
This was also true, although to a lesser degree, for the Asia Europe survey. This bunching at the 
extremes is caused by the fact that a significant proportion of respondents said they were worried 
about each of the dangers or said they were not worried about any of them. In effect, the tails of the 
distribution  are  censored  (fearfulness  certainly  varies  among  those  in  the  top  and  the  bottom 
categories, but the survey is not able to distinguish among them). Thus, in subsequent analysis I use 
OLS  for  the  regression  of  the  EB2005  data,  but  Tobit—which  assumes  an  underlying  Normal 
distribution but censored data—for the other three.   
Before examining the country-level patterns, Table 4 shows how these fear scores relate to 
characteristics of individuals. Previous work has found various traits to be associated with greater 
fearfulness. Women tend to report greater fear than men (Hersen 1973, Gullone 2000). Others have 
noted associations with age.11 Ross (1993, p.166) found that the married and well educated were less 
afraid of crime than the unmarried and poorly educated (although income was not significant).  
Regressing the fear indexes on these and other individual characteristics, along with controls 
for  the  respondent‘s  country,  I  found  evidence  of  greater  fearfulness  among  women,  at  least  in 
Europe, although not so clearly in the Asian countries included in the ASES (see Table 4). Older 
respondents were more afraid, although the rate at which fear increases with age apparently tapers 
off (age squared had a negative coefficient, sometimes statistically significant). Within Europe, there 
was some evidence that people who were married (or divorced) were more fearful than those never 
married, and having young children may have increased fearfulness, but these findings were not 
robust. The unemployed tended to be more fearful, and the more educated less fearful at least in the 
Eurobarometer surveys.  
                                                           
11 Rose and Ditto (1983) found that some fears increased with age, while others decreased.  17 
 
Table 4:   Individual level correlates of fearfulness 
            ---------EB2000---------  ---------EB2002---------  ---------EB2005---------  --------------------ASES-------------------- 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  All  Europe  Asia 
                   
Female  .41***   .42***   .50***   .52***   .31***   .32***   .08***   .13***   .01  
  (.05)  (.05)  (.05)  (.05)  (.02)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.02) 
                   
Age  .014**   .016**   .014**  .014*   .012***   .012***   .014***   .023***   .006 
  (.006)  (.008)  (.006)  (.007)  (.003)  (.003)  (.005)  (.007)  (.004) 
                   
Age squared  -.0001*  -.0001  -.0001  -.0001  -.0001***  -.0001***   -.0002***  -.0002***  -.0001** 
  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0001)  (.0000) 
                   
Married  .10*  .10*   .04   .02   .16***   .14***   -.01   -.01  -.01  
  (.06)  (.06)  (.05)  (.06)  (.03)  (.03)  (.02)  (.02)  (.04) 
                   
Divorced  .15**  .14**   .05   .04   .10**   .06        
  (.08)  (.07)  (.07)  (.08)  (.04)  (.04)       
                   
Widowed  .14*  .14*   .04    .06   .02   -.00        
  (.08)  (.08)  (.10)   (.10)  (.04)  (.04)       
                   
Has young    .06*  .10**  n.a.  n.a.  -.02  -.01  .03  .00  .07* 
children  (.03)  (.04)      (.02)  (.02)  (.02)  (.02)  (.04) 
                   
Years of   -.020***   -.019***   -.018***   -.015**   -.019***   -.020***   .005   .005   .004  
education  (.004)  (.004)  (.006)  (.007)  (.003)  (.00)  (.006)  (.009)  (.010) 
                   
Unemployed  .12*  .17**  .10   .11   .01   -.00   .16***   .18***  .15*  
  (.07)  (.08)  (.06)  (.07)  (.03)  (.03)  (.04)  (.05)  (.08) 
                   
Interviewed   -.04   .006   -.10**   -.11***   -.11***   -.09***        
afternoon  (.03)  (.03)  (.04)  (.04)  (.02)  (.03)       
                   
Interviewed   -.13***   -.12**   -.17***   -.16***   -.10***   -.09***       
evening  (.04)  (.05)  (.04)  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)       
                   
Interviewed  -.13**   -.08   -.16***   -.17***   -.05   -.04        
night  (.06)  (.07)  (.06)  (.06)  (.05)  (.05)       
                   
Respondent  .05     .07     -.001          
not alone  (.05)    (.04)    (.02)         
                   
Log pseudo-                   
likelihood  -20275  -20264  -19475  -19465      -17666  -17645  -17645 
                   
R2           .1234  .1262       
                   
N  13,826  13,826  13,313  13,313  21,781  21,781  14,024  14,024  14,024 
                   
Method  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit   Tobit  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Sources: see appendix. 
Note: Dependent variable is standardized individual fear score. Robust standard errors, clustered by country; *** p < .01, ** p 
< .05, * p < .10. Tobit regressions used when considerable weight at maximum and minimum values of the fear score scale. 
Column 2 models show estimated effects for respondents who were alone when interviewed. All regressions include country 
dummies. Question on children not asked in 2002 survey.  
 
Besides individual characteristics, aspects of the interview setting could affect the answers 
respondents give. I hypothesized that people might feel more fearful at some times of the day than at 
others. The data strongly confirm this. Fearfulness appears to decline during the day, with those 18 
 
interviewed  after  6  p.m.  very  significantly  less  afraid  than  those  surveyed  in  the  morning.  This 
pattern appears in all three Eurobarometer surveys, which recorded the interview times. Several 
explanations are possible, but a plausible conjecture is that many of those reached in the evening 
had already acquired a dose of ―Dutch courage‖—alcohol may reduce feelings of insecurity.  
One concern is that respondents might answer questions insincerely if interviewed in the 
presence of family members or friends. They might either hide their fears in order to seem brave, or 
invent worries about world peace and global warming in order to seem concerned and serious. The 
effect  of having  others  present  might  also  vary  across  countries  in  line  with  social  expectations. 
Using  interaction  terms,  I  confirmed  this:  in  many  countries,  the  average  answers  given  by 
respondents in company differed from those given by respondents interviewed while alone, and the 
direction of the effect did vary from country to country. These balanced out across countries so that 
there was no statistically significant effect of having others present in the survey sample as a whole. 
In  Table  4,  columns  marked  (1)  contain  regression  coefficients  for  the  whole  population;  those 
marked (2) contain coefficients for those respondents who were alone (i.e. estimated from regressions 
including  interaction  terms).  Whether  the  respondent  was  alone  was  sometimes  associated  with 
small  changes  in  the  effects  of  other  variables.  For  instance,  in  EB2000  unemployed  people 
interviewed  alone  confessed  to  more  fear  than  those  interviewed  in  front  of  family  members  or 
friends. So did parents of young children who were interviewed alone.  
Using these fear indexes, I derived average country fear scores by regressing the individual 
level fear indexes on country dummies. The coefficients from these regressions are shown in Table 5 
in the columns labeled ―Unadjusted.‖ I also show scores that have been adjusted to take into account 
relevant differences in the interviewees in different countries. The columns marked ―Adjusted‖ show 
country effects derived from regressions that also control for gender, age, marital status, years of 
education, employment status, and—for the Eurobarometer surveys, which provided the necessary 
data—the time of day when the interview was conducted as well as whether the respondent was 
alone when interviewed (allowing this effect to vary by country by means of interaction terms). The 
―adjusted‖ coefficients shown are for an employed, never married, 30-year-old male with 12 years of  19 
 
Table 5:   Country fear scores  
  -------EB2000-------  -------EB2002-------  -------EB2005------- 
Asia Europe 
Survey 2001 
Arrindell et al. 
index of fear of 
bodily injury, 
illness and death 
W. Europe  Unadj.  Adjusted  Unadj.  Adjusted  Unadj.  Adjusted  Unadj.  Adjusted   
                    Portugal  1.24  .85  1.04  .76  .00  -.27  -.08  -.13   
Cyprus          .43  .17       
Greece  .92  .51  1.02  .72  .48  .15  1.20  1.14  13.8 
Spain  .77  .43  .68  .40  -.14  -.48  .22  .16  12.1 
Italy  .01  -.31  .31  .01  .53  .25  .16  .09  13.5 
Malta          .30  -.03       
France  .03  -.24  .21  -.04  .10  -.27  -.32  -.40   
Germany   .23  -.06  .10  -.18  -.10  -.43  -.02  -.08  11.2 
   West  .11  -.16  .00  -.26  -.08  -.42       
   East  .59  .28  .41  .08  -.15  -.47       
Luxembourg  .15  -.22  .15  -.17  .01  -.36       
Ireland  .16  -.10  .30  .01  -.34  -.64  -.80  -.86   
UK  .15  -.25  .23  -.15  -.26  -.57  -.37  -.43   
 G. Britain  .14  -.27  .24  -.14  -.27  -.57      1.7 
 N. Ireland  .48  .12  .40  .07  -.12  -.45       
Denmark  -.24  -.48  -.27  -.44  -.23  -.55       
Sweden  .00  -.23  -.21  -.38  -.69  -1.01  -.41  -.47  1.5 
Belgium  -.19  -.53  -.31  -.61  -.14  -.48       
Austria  -.22  -.55  -.45  -.76  -.06  -.36       
Finland  -.48  -.75  -.49  -.70  -.43  -.76       
Netherlands  -.46  -.68  -.56  -.88  -.50  -.81       
 
                 
E. Europe                   
 
                 
Poland          .42  .07       
Hungary          .11  -.21      12.5 
Slovenia          .07  -.22       
Czech Rep.          -.05  -.39       
Slovakia          -.18  -.50       
 
                 
Former Soviet                   
 
                 
Lithuania          .39  .07       
Latvia          .36  .05       
Estonia          -.18  -.48       
 
                 
Asia                   
 
                 
Philippines              1.09  1.03   
Japan              .52  .46  18.7 
South Korea              .47  .40   
Malaysia              -.01  -.05   
Thailand              -.02  -.07   
Taiwan              .00  -.06   
Indonesia              -.03  -.09   
China              -.35  -.42   
Singapore                    -1.16  -1.21    
                    Sources: Author‘s calculations from EB2000, EB2002, EB2005, ASES; Arrindell et al. (2004, Table 1). 
Note: country scores constructed as follows. First, the first principal component (FPC) was estimated for answers to the 5-14 
questions on fear in the given survey, using the polychoric correlation matrix since variables are ordinal. The FPC was then 
standardized and regressed on country dummies, using Tobit when the FPC‘s distribution had considerable weight on end 
values (EB2000, EB2002, ASES), OLS otherwise (EB 2005), and using sampling weights. ―Unadjusted‖ columns show the 
coefficients on country dummies. For comparability, ―adjusted‖ columns contain country coefficients estimated in each case 
for an employed, never married 30-year-old male with 12 years of education. Where possible (EB2000, EB2002, EB2005), 
they also adjust for the time of day and circumstances of  interview (coefficients are for morning and interviewed alone).   20 
 
Table 6:   Fear scores for main Western European regions 
  2000  2002    2000  2002 
Greece      Germany     
North    .60  Schleswig-Holstein  -.43  -.38 
Central    .81  Saarland  .54  -.24 
East and South 
Islands 
  .51 
West Berlin 
.67  .28 
Spain      Hamburg  -.35  -.44 
Galicia  .54  -.31  Niedersachsen  -.44  .17 
Canaria  1.79  .65  Bremen  -.55  -.56 
North  -.67  -.21  Nordrhein-Westfalen  -.38  -.59 
Northeast  -.58  -.42  Hessen  .13  -.14 
Aragon and Rioja  -.31  -.56  Rheinland Pfalz  .28  -.20 
Madrid  .31  .54  Baden-Wurttemberg  -.07  -.22 
Central  .66  .44  Bayern  -.11  -.31 
Catalonia  .34  .58  East Berlin  .08  .08 
East  .37  .43  Brandenburg  .30  -.05 
South  1.12  1.06  Mecklenburg  -.17  .26 
Finland      Sachsen  .43  .21 
Uusimaa  -.76  -.91  Sachsen-Anhalt  .31  -.08 
Etelä-Suomi  -.70  -.67  Thuringen  .50  .29 
Itä-Suomi  -1.04  -.68  Italy     
Väli-Suomi  -.44  -.55  Northwest  -.37  .04 
Pohjois-Suomi  -.86  -.50  Sicily  -.24  .19 
Austria      Sardinia    .85 
East    -.85  Lombardy  -.44  .16 
South    -.52  Northeast  .01  -.28 
West    -.78  Emilia Romagna  -.27  -.24 
France      Central  -.31  -.25 
Ile de France  -.37  .02  Lazio  -.01  .29 
Bassin Parisien  -.29  -.18  Molise Abruzzi  -.10  .00 
Nord, Pas de Calais  .01  -.03  Campania  -.36  .05 
East  -.41  -.03  South  .35  -.09 
West  -.21  -.01  Ireland     
Southwest  -.14  -.30  Dublin  .25  -.13 
Center-East  .37  .05  Rest of Leinster  .06  .33 
Mediterranean  -.42  .11  Munster  -.43  -.20 
Belgium      Connaught Ulster  -.40  .14 
Wallonie  -.31  -.26  UK     
Brussels  -.55  -.66  Scotland  .18  .30 
Vlaanderen  -.63  -.78  N, NW,  Yorks. Humberside  -.13  -.18 
Netherlands      E & W Midlands, E. Anglia  -.34  -.08 
North  -.67  -.99  Wales  -.41  .40 
East  -.69  -.56  GLC  -.25  -.32 
West  -.68  -1.14  Southeast and Southwest  -.77  -.18 
South  -.62  -.58  Northern Ireland  -.03  .00 
  Sources: Author‘s calculations from EB2000 and EB2002. 
Note: Calculated as in Table 5, but with region dummies (plus country dummies for countries that contained 
only one NUTS 2 region). Scores adjusted so that they represent average effect for an employed, never married, 
30-year-old male with 12 years of education, interviewed alone in the morning (with interactions for 
―interviewed alone‖ at the country level). Scores in bold for countries where the pattern in 2000 correlated 







Figure 2:   Fear in Western Europe, 2000-02 
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reasonably high.  
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education. The cross-country pattern of fear in the adjusted scores is very similar to that in the 
unadjusted scores (correlations all above r = .99), but for some countries there are small changes. 
Since men tend to express less fear than women, the adjusted scores for all countries are lower.  
From the Eurobarometer surveys, it is also possible to estimate average levels of the fear 
indexes  for  subregions  within  European  countries  (I  focus  on  the  ―NUTS  2‖  level  units  such  as 
provinces and counties). The range of fearfulness across regions within some countries turns out to 
be as large as the range across countries (see Table 6). In Spain in 2000, for instance, the most 
fearful  and  least  fearful  regions  were  further  apart  than  the  most  fearful  and  least  fearful  EU 
countries. On the scale on which Finland‘s (adjusted) national score was -.75 and Portugal‘s was .85, 
the most fearful Spanish region, the Canary Islands, had a score of 1.79, while Spain‘s North had a 
score of just -.67.  
Although many of the regional differences are statistically significant in a given year, it is 
another question whether they represent durable regional characteristics or more ephemeral shocks. 
One way to assess this is to examine whether, within particular countries, the regional fear scores 
from EB2000 correlate strongly with those from EB2002. It turns out there is a high positive cross-
regional  correlation  only  in  Spain,  Belgium,  and  West  Germany.  In  all  the  other  countries,  the 
pattern of regional differences in 2000 was not close to that in 2002, suggesting that—unlike the 
crossnational  patterns,  for  which  the  correlation  was  r  =  .95—the  subnational  differences  were 
mostly  fleeting.  Were  the  more  consistent  regional  divergences  in  Spain,  Belgium,  and  West 
Germany becoming more or less pronounced between these years? To check this, I calculated the 
correlations across regions within each country between the 2000 fear score and the change in 2000-
02. A negative correlation would suggest convergence among regions. The correlations were r = .999 
for Belgium, suggesting increasing divergence among its three regions; r = -.69 for Spain, suggesting 
moderately fast convergence; and r = -.77 for West Germany, suggesting more rapid convergence. 
Figure 1 maps how fearfulness was distributed across the countries of Western Europe in 2000-02. 
For most countries, I indicate the national (adjusted) fear score, averaged for 2000 and 2002, while 23 
 
for Spain, Germany, and Belgium, I indicate how fearfulness varied across the countries‘ subregions, 
again averaged for 2000 and 2002. 
 
4   Validity of the data 
How much faith should one have in these data? As demonstrated, the crossnational patterns are 
quite consistent across surveys and types of fear. As a further validity check, I include in Table 5 
another index of fearfulness constructed by a team of social psychologists in the mid-1990s. Arrindell 
et al. (2004) administered a standard questionnaire to college students in 11 countries, asking about 
five types of fear: social; agoraphobic; bodily injury, illness, and death; sexual and aggressive scenes; 
and harmless animals. For each set of questions, they extracted the first principal component. In 
Table 4, I show the country average level of fear for the category ―bodily injury, illness, and death,‖ 
which  was  closest  in  content  to  the  fears  examined  by  the  Eurobarometer  and  ASES  surveys. 
Although  only  6-7  of  Arrindell  et  al.‘s  countries  are  also  in  any  given  survey  studied  here,  the 
correlation between their fear of bodily injury, illness, and death score and the indexes of fearfulness 
I constructed was high (from r = .48 to r = .93, and even higher if two outliers—Italy and Japan—
were excluded; see Figures A1-A4 in the appendix).   
  Still, several possible problems merit consideration. First, can we be sure that respondents in 
different countries understand the same thing when asked about their fears? It could be that in some 
cultures what English-speakers refer to as ―fear‖ is not a commonly recognized emotion.  Second, 
even if the emotional experience of fear is common to all cultures studied, it could be that the words 
used to translate ―afraid‖ or ―worried‖ into the relevant languages have different connotations or 
intensity,  which  could  explain  different  rates  of  affirmative  answers.  Third,  in  some  countries, 
displaying emotions is culturally discouraged. Apparent crossnational differences in fear might in 
fact be picking up differences in sincerity, caused by varying social norms on expressing emotions. I 
consider these points in turn.  24 
 
  The difficulty of comparing the subjective experiences of survey respondents is a serious one. 
But it is one common to all survey research, including that within a single country. We cannot know 
whether the ―fear‖ that any two respondents report feeling is the same, or even similar. That said, 
research has uncovered some powerful cross-cultural associations between the names of the basic 
emotions, facial expressions, and physiological responses. Across a broad set of cultures a particular 
facial expression—characterized by widened eyes, furrowed brows, and lips stretched horizontally—
is associated with the emotion usually translated as ―fear‖ in English (Keltner and Ekman 2000). 
Pictures of such ―fearful‖ expressions have been found to trigger distinct neuronal responses in the 
amygdala, where fear is processed, as well as in the autonomic nervous sytem. The more extreme the 
fear suggested by the picture, the greater the response (Morris et al. 1996). Such amygdala responses 
have been found in the US, Europe, and Japan (Morris et al. 1996; Chiao et al. 2008).12 Performing 
the  ―fearful‖  facial  expression  has  been  found  to  produce  an  accelerated  heart  rate  and  shorter 
breathing among both Americans and the Minangkabau of West Sumatra (Levenson et al. 1992). 
While an emotion corresponding to the English ―fear‖ is found in all known cultures, most 
languages contain multiple words corresponding to different types and intensities (Russell 1991). If a 
milder  word  was  used  in  some  countries  than  in  others,  this  could  influence  the  survey  results. 
Although this may be an issue at the margin, it is unlikely to have caused the large crossnational 
divergences observed in Table 1. If a more emphatic word was used in the Netherlands than in other 
countries, one would expect low levels of reported fear among the Dutch with regard to all dangers. 
But that is not what we see. Most dangers elicited few reports of fear from the Dutch respondents. 
Yet 75 percent of them said they were afraid of organized crime. Few Austrians were afraid of world 
war or epidemics; but 85 percent were afraid of a nuclear accident. The words used for ―afraid‖ in the 
Netherlands and Austria do not seem to have been too strong for Dutch and Austrian respondents to 
admit to the emotion. Although most Dutch, Austrian, and Finnish respondents reported relatively 
few fears, a large proportion confessed to some.  
                                                           
12 Chiao et al. (2008) found that the response was greater when the fearful face was of the subject‘s own cultural 
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In some cultures expressing emotions such as fear in public is more accepted than in others. 
Thus, respondents might reply insincerely to questions about their fears because of embarrassment, 
caution, or social pressures. I have already addressed this to some extent by adjusting the fear scores 
for whether respondents were alone when interviewed. But cultural norms might still affect answers 
even when only the interviewer was present.  
I explore this in two ways. First, one might expect male respondents to be more inhibited 
from  admitting  fear  in  more  ―macho‖  cultures,  where  men  are  expected  to  be  tough,  brave,  and 
unemotional. The sociologist Geert Hofstede, using crossnational questionnaires, has produced an 
index of the extent to which different countries exhibit ―masculine‖ cultural values. If such values 
were distorting the results, countries with more masculine cultures should have lower fear scores. In 
fact, there was a non-significant positive correlation between Hofstede‘s masculine values score and 
the  level  of  fear  (in  EB2000,  EB2002,  EB2005,  and  ASES).13 The  correlation  was  even  slightly 
stronger for male respondents taken separately.  
    To  check  this  in  a  second  way,  I  used  a  more  direct  measure  of  expressivity  norms 
constructed by the social psychologist David Matsumoto (Matsumoto et al. 2008). Matsumoto and 
colleagues surveyed 5,361 college students in 32 countries with a standard questionnaire about the 
norms governing the display of seven common emotions—anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise. Respondents were asked how they should behave if, in a variety of specific 
contexts,  they  felt  the  given  emotion.  Options  in  each  case  were:  ―show  more  than  you  feel  it,‖ 
―express it as you feel it,‖ ―show the emotion while smiling at the same time,‖ ―show less than you 
feel  it,‖  ―hide  your  feelings  by  smiling,‖  ―show  nothing,‖  and  ―other.‖  From  the  responses,  the 
researchers derived an expressivity index. If expression norms were distorting the results, reported 
fear should be lower in countries with lower culturally-condoned expressivity. Figures A5 and A6 in 
the appendix show that, in fact, norms against expressing emotions correlate positively with higher 
                                                           
13 Arrindell et al. (2004) argue that masculine culture might actually induce greater fear. I did not find a 
significant relationship using the data examined in this paper.  
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reported  fear.  In  countries  like  Italy  and  Greece,  where  expressing  emotions  is  frowned  upon, 
respondents confessed to the most fear.14 
 
5   Pessimism and fear 
In Section 2, I suggested that the intensity of the fear an individual feels when contemplating a 
possible future event will depend on several factors: the intensity of the subconscious fear reaction 
(which will depend on both genetic factors and conditioning), the expected aversiveness of the event, 
the perceived probability of its occurrence, and the individual‘s arousability in the face of dangers. 
The evaluation of the probability and aversiveness will depend, in turn, on the individual‘s beliefs 
and values, mood, and even such situational details as the vividness of his mental imagery.  
  Measuring how these factors vary across countries  presents an obvious challenge. In this 
section  I  construct  an  estimate  of  one  of  them—the  extent  to  which  respondents  from  different 
countries exaggerate the probability of unpleasant events—and call this ―pessimism.‖ I then examine 
how much of the crossnational variation in the previously constructed fear indexes can be explained 
by this.  
At the outset, it is worth noting that the levels of fear expressed by survey respondents are 
themselves only weakly related to the objectively measured probabilities of the feared events. For 
four  dangers—terrorism,  BSE  (mad  cow  disease),  medical  errors,  and  swine  flu—I  was  able  to 
construct an objective crossnational measure of the risk. For terrorism, I counted for each country 
how  many  deaths  and  injuries  had  been  caused  by  terrorism  in  1995-1999  (using  the  Rand 
Corporation‘s Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents), and then divided this by the population 
to  get  the  rate  per  million  inhabitants.  Figure  A7  in  the  appendix  shows  this  estimate  of  the 
objective risk plotted against the percentage of respondents who said in 2000 that they were afraid of 
                                                           
14 Of course, it would be better if data on norms about expressing specifically fear were available, rather than 
norms relating to all seven emotions; still, what data are available suggest the observed crossnational patterns 
might be even stronger if it were not for expressivity norms. 27 
 
terrorism  (from  EB2000).15 As  can  be  seen,  the  relationship  is  weak.  If  one  excludes  Northern 
Ireland,  which  had  many  times  more  terrorist  casualties  than  other  European  countries,  the 
correlation is r = .16.  
  To estimate the risk of contracting BSE (―mad cow disease‖), I used the natural log of the 
number of cases reported in farmed cattle in the country in question between 1989 (around the time 
of  the  first  major  outbreak)  and  2004.16 Figure  A8  shows  this  plotted  against  the  percentage  of 
respondents who said in 2005 that they were worried about the disease. There is no relationship at 
all. Some of the highest levels of fear occurred in countries such as Greece, Latvia, and Lithuania 
that had experienced almost no cases of BSE. (These were, however, countries that ranked high on 
my indexes of fearfulness.) 
  To study medical errors, I used two questions in the EB2005 survey. Figure A9 shows the 
percentage afraid of being harmed by a medical error plotted against the percentage of respondents 
who said that they or a family member had actually suffered from one (in a hospital or as a result of 
a doctor‘s prescription). Here there is a positive correlation—r = .33—but it is a relatively weak one, 
leaving much variation unexplained. Finally, Figure A10 shows countries‘ rates of infection with the 
H1N1 swine flu virus up to mid-May 2009 plotted against the percentage of respondents to the Pew 
GAP poll taken the following month who said that they were worried about the virus (of those who 
had  heard  of  it).  The  relationship  is  negative  (r  =  -.58).17 Worry  about  the  swine  flu  was  most 
widespread in countries such as Russia and Indonesia that had experienced no cases at all.  
  If differences in objective measures of risk explain relatively little of the variation in fear 
scores, what about differences in perceived risk?  I first establish that perceived risk differs from 
objective indicators in these data. EB2005 asked respondents how likely they thought they were to 
fall  victim  to  a  number  of  dangers.  These  included  terrorism,  crime,  and  injury  in  a  car  crash. 
                                                           
15 I take the natural log of the risk measure since most countries‘ scores were very low but a few were much 
higher. 
 
16 Data are from the World Organization for Animal Health.  
 
17 Even if one does not exclude respondents who had not heard of the swine flu virus—a very small proportion in 
most countries, but higher in Pakistan, Nigeria, and India—the correlation is negative (r = -.34) 28 
 
Elsewhere in the survey, respondents were asked how likely they thought it was that a patient in a 
hospital in their country ―would suffer a serious medical error because of the hospital doctors or 
medical staff.‖ For each of these questions, I calculated what percentage of the respondents from 
each country thought the outcome very or fairly likely.  
I compared these frequencies to objective estimates of the risks. For terrorism, I again used 
the log of the number of deaths and injuries per million inhabitants from the Rand Corporation‘s 
database but this time focusing on 2000-04, the five-year period preceding the survey in question. 
For medical errors, I used the percentage of respondents from the relevant country who, on the same 
survey, said that they or a family member had suffered a serious medical error in a local hospital. To 
estimate the risk of being injured in a car crash, I used the road traffic death rate per 100,000 people 
in 2007 estimated by the World Health Organization for its  2009  Global Status Report on Road 
Safety. (These figures adjust the number of reported traffic deaths for accuracy and include deaths of 
cyclists  and  pedestrians  as  well  as  drivers.)  Finally,  I  used  data  from  the  2005  International 
Criminal Victimization Survey to assess the risk of becoming a crime victim. Specifically, I added 
together the five-year prevalence rates of victimization for six categories of major crimes: burglary, 
attempted burglary, robbery, theft of personal property, sexual offences against women, and assaults 
and threats.   
  In each case, there was a weak to moderate correlation across countries between the measure 
of objective risk and the percentage of EB2005 respondents who thought themselves very or fairly 
likely to be victimized (r = .35 to .43). Thus, the objective risk does help to explain the subjective 
perception. However, a great deal of the variation was unrelated to the objective risk. To construct 
an index of pessimism, I proceeded in two stages. First, for each of the four dangers, I regressed the 
perceived likelihood of being a victim on the relevant measure of objective risk (both at the country 
level). The residuals from each of these four regressions—that is, the part of the variation that could 
not be explained by objective risk—constitute a measure of relative pessimism or optimism regarding 
the danger in question. These four sets of residuals correlated with each other at rates of from r = .32 
to r = .78 and had a Cronbach‘s alpha of .69. Second, I extracted the first principal component of the 29 
 
four sets of residuals to form an index of overall pessimism. Since missing data for several countries 
meant that this index was available for only 18 of the 27 countries, I also extracted the first principal 
component using just the medical errors and terrorism variables, which were available for all the 
countries. The pessimism index constructed in this way was very strongly correlated with the index 
formed using all four variables (r = .92).  
 
Figure 3  shows the  EB2005  index of fear plotted against  the second index of pessimism. 
About  two  thirds  of  the  crossnational  variation  in  fear  can  be  explained  by  variation  in  the 
pessimism  index  (R-squared  =  .66).  Judging  by  these  results,  that  Lithuanians  and  Poles  are 
considerably more fearful than East Germans or  Danes can be entirely explained by the greater 
pessimism  of  the  former:  compared  to  Germans  or  Danes,  Polish  and  Lithuanian  respondents 
overestimated the likelihood of unpleasant outcomes more. Similarly, the Estonians are more fearful 
than the Finns—and the Maltese than the Spanish—because the former are more pessimistic  














































































Figure 3:   Pessimism and fear, 2005 
Sources: Author's calculations, Eurobarometer 2005, other sources as described in text.   30 
 
Of course, given the limitations of the data and the potential for measurement error, this 
exercise  can  be  no  more than  suggestive.  Still,  it  appears  that  besides  differences  in  pessimism, 
differences in other factors also matter. For instance, Cyprus and Slovakia have about the same 
pessimism  score,  yet  the  Cypriots  are  considerably  more  fearful  than  the  Slovaks.  For  a  given 
assessment of the danger, they apparently have a stronger emotional reaction.  
 
6   Fear and trust 
A  growing  literature  in  economics  and  political  science  has  drawn  attention  to  cross-national 
differences in ―social‖ or ―civic‖ capital, usually associated with a readiness to trust others.18 It is 
plausible  that  differences  in  fearfulness,  both  among  individuals  and  across  countries,  might  be 
related to differences in trust. A low level of trust—either of the national authorities or of others in 
general—might cause people to exaggerate the risk that others will bring about harmful outcomes.19 
On the other hand, a predisposition to fearfulness could lead individuals to distrust others. Or it 
could  be  that  particular  cultural  factors  or  historical  experiences—civil  war,  for  instance—
simultaneously spread fearfulness and distrust within a given population.  
  Do the measures of fearfulness developed in this paper correlate with measures of trust? 
Using  the  Eurobarometer  and  ASES  data,  I  examined  the  relationship  at  three  levels:  that  of 
individuals  in  the  full  sample  of  countries;  that  of  individuals  within  particular  countries  (i.e. 
controlling for country differences); and that of country averages on the fear and trust indexes. To 
measure trust, I constructed two variables. First, I created a measure of the respondent‘s trust in the 
national authorities. For the Eurobarometer surveys, this is the first principal component from a 
factor analysis of answers to questions that asked whether the respondent tended to trust the legal 
system, the police, the army, the civil service, the national parliament, and—for 2002 and 2005, 
                                                           
18 For a recent review, see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010).  
 
19 Studies have noted a significant but relatively low correlation between measures of trust and risk perception 
(e.g. Viklund 2003).  31 
 
where  this  was  available—also  the  national  government.20 For  ASES,  I  used  the  first  principal 
component  from  a  factor  analysis  of  answers  to  questions  that  asked  how  much  confidence  the 
respondent had in the national parliament, the national government, the law and the courts, the 
country‘s main political leaders, the police, the civil service, and the military.21 For EB2000, EB2002, 
and ASES, I was able to use data from the same surveys as were used to produce fearfulness scores, 
making it possible to examine correlations among individuals. Unfortunately, the questions about 
trust  were  not  asked  in  the  EB2005  survey.  However,  these  questions  were  asked  in  another 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in the same year (October-November 2005), and so I constructed 
country averages of trust in the authorities (for 2005) using this survey. As for fear, I created country 
averages both unadjusted and adjusted for various individual characteristics. 
  Second,  I  constructed  measures  of  generalized  trust  using  the  now  standard  question: 
―Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be  trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?‖ This question was not asked in any of the Eurobarometer surveys 
from which I constructed fear scores, so I could not explore the relationship at the individual level. I 
used  the  World  Values  Survey  (2000  wave)  to  form  country-level  measures  of  the  percentage  of 
respondents who thought that generally speaking most people could be trusted. 
  Table 7 shows the correlations between these measures of trust and the fear indexes created 
earlier. As can be seen (columns 1 and 2), among individuals the relationship between fearfulness 
and trust of the national authorities ranges from nonexistent to weak (r of from -.004 to -.24). This is 
true  whether  or  not  one  controls  for  country.  However,  there  is  a  stronger  correlation  between 
countries‘ average levels of fear and of trust in the national authorities (r ranging from -.25 to -.51; 
see columns 3 and 4). And, in the European data, there are even higher correlations between country 
averages of fear and of trust in people in general (column 5).  
In other words, within a given country—or within a broader set of them—individuals who  
                                                           
20 Respondents could answer ―tend to trust,‖ ―tend not to trust,‖ or ―don‘t know‖; because the data are not 
continuous, I use the polychoric correlation matrix in the principal components analysis. 
 
21 Respondents could choose between: ―a great deal,‖ ―quite a lot,‖ ―not much,‖ ―none at all,‖ ―don‘t know,‖ and 
―haven‘t thought much about it.‖ I excluded the latter two categories and used the polychoric correlation matrix. 32 
 
are more distrustful of their national authorities tend to be only slightly, if at all, more fearful. But, 
the average level of fear tends to be higher in countries where the average level of trust is lower. 
Various  processes  could  produce  these  patterns.  It  could  be  that  certain  country  characteristics 
produce both fear and distrust—but not necessarily in the same people. Or it might be that different 
country characteristics that tend to occur together separately predispose people towards distrust and 
fear. Even focusing on the  country averages, a considerable part of the variation in fear is unrelated 
to  trust.  For  instance,  in  EB2002,  where  the  relationship  between  fear  and  generalized  trust  is 
strongest  (r  =  -.69),  Greece  and  Belgium  had  similarly  low  levels  of  trust  (24  and  31  percent, 
respectively) but very different levels of fear: Greece was the second most fearful country, while 
Belgium was the fourth least fearful.   
 
Table 7:   Fear and trust, correlation coefficients 
     
Trust in national authorities 
Trust in "most 
people" 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
















EB2000  -.10  -.05  -.51  -.50  -.63 
EB2002  -.04  -.004  -.50  -.48  -.69 
EB2005  n.a.  n.a.  -.26  -.25  -.67 
ASES  -.24  -.15  -.47  -.46  -.23 
Sources: Eurobarometer surveys (2000, 2002, 2005) )and World Values Survey (2000). 
Note: figures are correlation coefficients between fear score and index of trust in national authorities or in 
people in general. ―Adjusted‖ country percentages control for gender, age, marital status, education, 
unemployment, and for Eurobarometer surveys also the time of interview and whether the respondents was 
interviewed alone. Figures in (2) are partial correlation coefficients controlling for country.  
 
  Although fearfulness and distrust correlate at the level of countries, they do not seem to be 
merely noisy indicators of the same underlying phenomenon. If they were, we should expect to see 
stronger correlations at the level of individuals. Another way to check this is to see whether a factor 
analysis of survey responses on fear and on trust of the authorities identifies a single dimension that 
is  correlated  with  both  fear  and  trust,  or  whether  it  identifies  distinct  dimensions  for  the  two 
dispositions. Using the EB2000 data, I analyzed the 10 questions on different fears (as in footnote 33 
 
10)  and  the  five  questions  on  trust  of  different  national  authorities.  The  analysis  identified  two 
important dimensions. The first, which explained 45 percent of the variation, correlated at r = .99 
with  my  unadjusted  fearfulness  index.  The  second,  which  explained  another  21  percent  of  the 
variation, correlated at r = .98 with the trust of state authorities index.22  
 
7   Explaining the pattern 
Besides  decomposing  the  crossnational  variation  in  fear  into  its  proximate  cognitive  and 
subconscious  causes  (pessimism,  arousability,  etc.),  one  would  like  to  know  why  people  in  some 
places  are  more  afraid  than  those  in  others.  What  characteristics  of  countries  predispose  their 
populations  to  be  more  or  less  fearful?  The  available  data  do  not  permit  confident  conclusions. 
Measures of fear are only available for a relatively small number of countries, mostly in Europe. 
Multiple  feedbacks  are  bound  to  connect  fear  with  its  causes.  I  present  here  only  a  preliminary 
analysis which sorts through arguments, demonstrates correlations, and suggests plausible paths, 
but which stops well short of establishing causal links.  
  A variety of factors might matter. One possible source of variation is genetic. Predispositions 
to fear have been shown to be heritable, and some research has even identified certain genes that 
affect fear processing (Montag et al. 2008). Such work is in its infancy, however, and I know of no 
studies that look for crossnational patterns in the relevant genetic variations. I will not examine 
genetic factors here, and any influence they have must remain in the regressions‘ residuals.  
  Besides genes, how people process danger signals will depend on their culture. Individuals 
draw on their repertoire of previously acquired beliefs and values to form estimates of the probability 
and aversiveness of events (Figure 1). These beliefs and values are internalized through processes of 
socialization within families and in institutions such as churches, schools, and economic and political 
organizations, as well as from media communications. Crossnational differences in these institutions 
                                                           
22 The correlations between the first factor and the trust index and the second factor and the fearfulness index 
were both less than r = .2. A similar factor analysis conducted on country averages for the trust and the fear 
questions also identifies two factors—the first explaining 55 percent of the variation and correlated very highly 
with fear, the second explaining another 15 percent of the variation and correlated highly with distrust.  34 
 
will generate crossnational differences in the relevant beliefs  and values.  Social institutions also 
condition subconscious responses, sensitizing and desensitizing individuals to specific dangers.  
  A country‘s level of economic development may also affect the fearfulness of its inhabitants. 
People in richer countries tend to report being happier than those in poor countries (Stephenson and 
Wolfers  2008),  and  happier  people  tend  to  be  more  optimistic.  This  would  suggest  a  negative 
relationship between income and fear.  At the same time, in richer countries the state is usually 
better at protecting its citizens from various disasters, natural and man-made, and more kinds of 
insurance are available. This also might decrease fear. On the other hand, reduced vulnerability to 
common dangers might render people more emotionally responsive to the threats that remain. Not 
having to worry about economic survival, citizens of richer countries might have more time to obsess 
about the most dramatic, existential dangers such as nuclear war or global warming. 
  Another  source  of  possible  variation  is  the  extent  of  present  or  past  violence.  Previous 
experiences of extreme stress—such as living through a war or under a repressive government—can 
produce  lasting  pyschological  changes.  An  extended  period  of  fear  may  sensitize  the  mind  to 
threatening  signals,  causing  it  to  prioritize  messages  about  dangers,  to  selectively  retrieve 
information that exacerbates anxiety, and to overestimate the risks of bad outcomes (Bar-Tal 2001, 
p.604). In countries that have undergone war or authoritarian rule in recent decades, citizens might 
remain traumatized.  
Finally,  besides  propagating  beliefs  and  values,  a  country‘s  media  will  focus  the  public‘s 
attention  on  particular  threats  (Bar-Tal  and  Antebi  1992).  If  sensationalism  is  the  result  of 
competition for readers, a more competitive press environment may correlate with higher fear. One 
might expect that government-controlled media would try to avoid alarming the public. On the other 
hand, if governments censor information about dangers in order to prevent panics, this may actually 
fuel the development of conspiracy theories, exacerbating fear. Some governments may deliberately 
use state-controlled media to spread particular kinds of fear—of foreign threats, for instance—in an 
effort to increase their domestic support. 
To examine the evidence, I gathered data on a number of variables. For economic  35 
 
development, I use the natural log of GDP per capita in the preceding year, measured at purchasing 
power parity. To capture the effect of recent authoritarian government, I use the widely-employed 
Polity scores; I constructed a dummy for whether in at least one year since 1960 the country received 
a rating of less than -5 on the scale that runs from -10 (pure autocracy) to +10 (pure democracy). For 
recent war or violent conflict, I use the number of years since 1960 in which armed force in a conflict 
that included the government had resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths. My first measure of 
media exposure is the average answer to a question on the EB2000 survey which asked how often 
the  respondent  watched  the  news  on  television;  respondents  could  choose  between  five  answers 
ranging from ―every day‖ to ―never.‖ For the ASES, I instead use the average answer to a question on 
that survey which asked ―How often do you follow accounts of political or governmental affairs in a 
national newspaper, magazine, radio, or television?‘ Respondents could answer ―regularly,‖ ―from 
time to time,‖ or ―never.‖ To measure state control of the media, I used the proportion of the top five 
television stations that were state-owned, weighted by their share of total viewers.  
To  gauge  crossnational  differences  in  cultural  beliefs  and  values,  one  can  either  try  to 
measure the prevalence of particular beliefs and values themselves or focus on differences in the 
social  institutions  that  propagate  them,  such  as  schools  and  religious  organizations.  To  capture 
differences in the latter, I use dummy variables recording which religion is dominant in the country, 
defined  as  the  religion—if  any—that  counted  more  than  50  percent  of  the  population  among  its 
adherents in 2000. The level of adherence to a particular religion today might itself partly result 
from fear—those more afraid of war or sudden death might seek spiritual comfort in the church—but 
for most countries the identity of the nationally dominant religion was determined hundreds of years 
ago by wars and flows of missionaries; it can therefore be considered somewhat more exogenous.  
Schools also socialize citizens in distinctive ways. Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) argue 
that the educational styles dominant in different countries render their populations more or less 
trusting and predisposed to cooperate with strangers. They distinguish two ideal type pedagogical 
styles: ―vertical,‖ in which teachers stand at the blackboard lecturing and asking students questions 
while students take notes, and ―horizontal,‖ in which students work in groups on collective projects 36 
 
and ask teachers questions. I used two of Algan et al.‘s variables—the percentage of eighth grade 
students who said that in maths classes they always took notes from the board and the percentage of 
15-year-old students who said that they felt awkward in class.23    
Besides the analysis of trust in the previous section, I try to measure relevant differences in 
current  beliefs  and  values  in  two  ways.  First,  I  use  measures  of  the  cultural  dimensions  that 
sociologists  and political  scientists have considered significant. Inglehart  and collaborators  argue 
that much of the crossnational variation in cultures can be reduced to two dimensions, which they 
call  survival/self-expression  values  and  traditional/secular-rational  values  (Inglehart  and  Welzel 
2005, pp.48-54). The sociologist Geert Hofstede (2001) identifies five dimensions: power distance (i.e., 
acceptance of hierarchical authority), individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-
term  orientation.  Arrindell  et  al.  (2004),  in  their  study  of  11  countries,  found  that  fearfulness 
correlated with two of these: uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. 
Given how Inglehart‘s and Hofstede‘s dimensions are defined, it is plausible that they would 
correlate with fear. The definitions even overlap. Uncertainty avoidance, in Hofstede‘s words, is the 
extent to which  people ―feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations‖ (Hofstede 2001, p.161). 
One of three questions used to construct the index asks: ―How often do you feel nervous or tense at 
work?‖ In countries where more people feel nervous, tense, and threatened by unknown situations, it 
is  natural  to  expect  that  fear  of  catastrophic  outcomes  would  be  higher.24 Survivalist  values,  in 
Inglehart‘s usage, refer to the extent to which individuals emphasize economic and physical security 
as opposed to subjective well-being, self-expression, and quality of life (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 
p.52).  In  countries  where  more  people  are  preoccupied  with  economic  and  physical  security,  one 
might expect that a higher percentage would report being afraid of threats to their security.   
My second attempt to measure relevant cultural differences focuses on the content of  
                                                           
23 The first comes from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995 
in 33 countries, the second from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the 
OECD, for 2000 and 2003.  
 
24 The other two questions used by Hofstede to measure uncertainty avoidance are not directly related to fear, 
however. They ask how long the respondent expects to continue working for the same company and whether it is 
acceptable to break company rules when an employee believes this to be in the company‘s best interest.  37 
 
religious beliefs. Whereas the nature of a country‘s dominant religion is generally rooted in history, 
how literally adherents take its doctrines can evolve over time. That religious beliefs might affect 
adherents‘ fearfulness was originally suggested by Epicurus, who, in Bertrand Russell‘s paraphrase, 
―held  that  two  of  the  greatest  sources  of  fear  were  religion  and  the  dread  of  death,  which  were 
connected, since religion encouraged the view that the dead are unhappy‖ (Russell 1946, p.254). How 
unhappy one believes the dead to be depends, in turn, on one‘s conception of the afterlife. I conjecture 
that belief in Hell should intensify fear of death, whereas belief in Heaven should alleviate fear. I 
measure these beliefs using two questions from the 2000 World Values Survey. While belief in Hell is 
highly correlated with belief in Heaven, in some countries far more people turn out to believe in the 
latter than in the former; this gap ranges from 0 percent in Indonesia to 32 percent in Ireland. 
Given the small number of cases and the fact that possible causes are correlated, it makes 
sense to begin by simply examining the correlation coefficients (Table 8). In most cases, the signs of 
these are consistent with expectations. There is a moderately strong  positive correlation between 
fearfulness  and  Orthodox  Christianity,  a  weaker  positive  correlation  with  Catholicism,  and  a 
negative correlation with a dominant Protestant tradition.25 The only Orthodox Christian country in 
EB2000, EB2002 and ASES is Greece, so the correlation simply picks up Greece‘s high fear score. In 
EB2005,  Greece  is  joined  by  Cyprus,  which  is  also  relatively  fearful.  (The  only  predominantly 
Muslim country is Indonesia in ASES, and its fear score is about average.) Past experiences of both 
authoritarian  rule  and  violent  conflict  correlate  with  higher  fearfulness  in  all  the  surveys,  and 
higher  economic  development  consistently  correlates  with  lower  fear.  There  were  also  low  to 
moderate  correlations  between  fear  and  an  indicator  of  ―vertical‖  style  of  education—in  which 
instruction consists mostly of students taking notes from the board—and between fear and students‘ 
feeling awkward in school. 
  
                                                           
25 The Eurobarometer surveys did not ask respondents their religion. The ASES did, permitting analysis at the 
individual level. Controlling for other individual characteristics and country, differences in fearfulness among 
individuals of different denominations were not generally significant, although the pattern of coefficients was 
the same for the Protestants, Catholics, and other Christians (including Orthodox). This might be because of the 
endogeneity of individual religious adherence. But it could also reflect the fact that national cultures are shaped 
by the dominant religious tradition—and then affect all citizens, not just those who are themselves religious.  38 
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EB2002  .95                                       
EB2005  .39  .56                                     
ASES  .49  .66  .68                                   
Catholic  .12  .18  .29  .02                                 
Protestant  -.14  -.19  -.52  -.19  -.27                               
Orthodox  .37  .46  .44  .51  -.15  -.07                             
Muslim  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -.02  -.24  -.12  -.07                           
                                          Auth. 
history  .84  .76  .31  .47  .12  -.27  -.01  .18                         
War years  .50  .56  .40  .32  -.13  -.20  .00  .56  .26                       
                                          School: 
take notes  .37  .43  .48  .35  .18  -.49  .21    .10  .17                     
                                          School: feel  
awkward  .28  .18  .32  .39  .12  -.35  .05  -.15  .04  -.08  .74                   
                                          Ln GDP  
p.c. 1999  -.49  -.47  -.40  -.28  .25  .23  .11  -.43  -.56  -.73  .06  .17                 
                                          Masculin-
ity  .12  .19  .18  .25  .24  -.24  .05  -.02  -.02  .04  .41  .16  -.06               
                                          Uncertainty 
avoidance  .52  .53  .64  .61  .40  -.37  .33  -.05  .29  -.27  .71  .64  .19  .10             
                                          Secular-
Rational  -.36  -.42  -.30  .13  -.40  .24  .07  -.39  .08  -.42  -.07  .10  .23  -.11  -.02           
                                          Self-
expression  -.65  -.67  -.57  -.11  .01  .47  .05  -.19  -.69  -.31  -.28  -.14  .70  -.14  -.12  .11         
                                          Believe  
in Hell  .35  .48  .47  .06  -.10  -.29  -.04  .61  .20  .64  .10  -.07  -.65  .13  -.13  -.76  -.43       
                                          Believe  
in Heaven  .21  .29  .23  -.07  -.05  -.24  -.08  .51  .12  .57  .01  -.10  -.57  .14  -.16  -.81  -.24  .93     
                                          TV use 
2000  -.09  -.03  .08  n.r.  -.45  .24  .26    .17  .05  -.49  -.58  -.39  -.12  -.20  .31  .04  .03  .04   
                                          National 
media  n.r.  n.r.  n.r.  .25  .22  -.12  .01  -.32  -.20  -.43  .32  .06  .43  .37  .51  .54  .20  -.54  -.58  .18 
State share  
in TV  -.50  -.55  -.40  -.69  -.27  .14  -.39  .09  -.26  -.24  -.24  -.05  -.07  -.05  -.44  .08  .20  .13  .17  -.01 
Sources: See Appendix Table A1. Correlation coefficients; n.a. not applicable. Most correlations are from sample including East and West Germany and Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland separately. Correlations with ASES are for sample with Germany and UK instead. N.a.: not applicable; n.r.: not relevant.  39 
 
Turning to measures of current values, Hofstede‘s masculinity and uncertainty avoidance 
both  correlate  positively  with  fearfulness,  but  the  first  is  not  usually  statistically  significant. 
Countries  that  were  higher  on  Inglehart‘s  secular-rational  vs.  traditional  and  self-expression  vs. 
survival scales tended to be less fearful in the European surveys— but the correlations were not 
significant in the ASES, which included Asian countries. Belief in Hell, as expected, correlated with 
higher  fear  in  the  European  surveys,  but  not  in  ASES.  Belief  in  Heaven  also  correlated  (more 
weakly) with higher fear; but, given the high correlation between the two beliefs, one might expect 
this result even if belief in Heaven is actually fear-reducing but has a weaker effect than belief in 
Hell. Finally, there was no clear correlation between fearfulness and exposure to the television news, 
but a larger state role in television correlated quite strongly with lower fear.  
Of  course,  simple  correlations  prove  little.  I  next  explore  which  variables  are  significant 
controlling for other likely determinants of fearfulness. It makes sense to consider at what stage on 
the  causal  pathway  different  variables  operate.  Values,  for  instance,  are  likely  to  be  partly 
determined by religious traditions and economic development. At the same time, some purported 
causes of fear may themselves be caused by it. A sensationalistic media will excite the public‘s fears; 
but the media may become sensationalistic in order to pander to fears that already exist.  
Given the limited data, these issues cannot be conclusively resolved. Still, one can  look a 
little more closely at the patterns. It seems reasonable to divide the explanatory variables into three 
groups: those that are most exogenous, rooted in distant history (countries‘ dominant religion); those 
that  are  less  exogenous,  relating  (mostly)  to  the  last  50  years  (authoritarian  experience,  war, 
economic development, educational style); and those that are not exogenous at all, relating to the 
current cultural and media environment (current beliefs and values, media characteristics). There 
are  plausible  paths  by  which  religious  traditions  may  have  influenced  the  type  of  government, 
involvement in wars, the rate of economic development, and educational style in recent decades. 
These variables may, in turn, have influenced the current distribution of beliefs and values and the 
media environment. With this in mind, I show a series of regressions for each country, starting with 
the most exogenous variables, then adding those in the middle group, and finally including the least 40 
 
exogenous variables. Since the number of observations is so low, I economize on degrees of freedom 
by  dropping  some  variables  whose  coefficients  are  close  to  zero  and  statistically  insignificant. 
Especially given the small number of cases, it makes sense to focus on results that are relatively 
robust. Findings that hold across the range of distinct fear measures are more likely to be genuine.  
What do the regressions reveal? First, countries‘ dominant religions can explain from 20 to 
45  percent  of  the  variation  in  fearfulness.  The  coefficients  on  the  religious  dummies  show  a 
consistent  pattern  across  all  the  surveys,  although  not  all  differ  signficantly  from  the  excluded 
category  (other  or  no  dominant  religion).  The  pattern  is  the  same  as  that  for  simple  correlation 
coefficients.  Orthodox  Christian  countries  (Greece,  along  with  Cyprus  in  EB2005)  are  the  most 
fearful, followed by the predominantly Catholic, and then the predominantly Protestant ones.  
In  EB2000  and  EB2002,  the  religious  tradition  effects  drop  sharply  once  I  include  the 
dummy  for  authoritarian  rule.  This  is  because  in  the  West  European  sample,  the  most  fearful 
countries—Orthodox  Greece  and  Catholic  Spain  and  Portugal—had  all  recently  experienced 
authoritarian rule.26 In EB2000, the authoritarian dummy can by itself explain 71 percent of the 
variation.  However,  once  one  includes  authoritarian  countries  from  Eastern  Europe  (EB2005)  or 
Asia (ASES), the authoritarian effect either weakens or disappears completely, while the religion 
dummies  remain  significant.  China,  for  instance,  has  relatively  low  fear  despite  a  history  of 
authoritarian government.27 So do Slovakia and Estonia. Meanwhile, some other Southern European 
countries that do not have recent authoritarian experience—Italy, Malta, and Cyprus—have very 
high fear. It could be that an authoritarian past increased fear in Western European countries. But 
it seems more likely that the variable is picking up a more general effect of religious traditions. (It 
could also be that the somewhat different set of fears explored in EB2005 and ASES explain the 
different results.) Controlling for religious tradition, there was no clear relationship between recent 
violent conflict and fearfulness in the European surveys, but years of war did correlate with higher  
fear in ASES. 
                                                           
26 The only other such country in EB2000 and EB2002 was East Germany.  
 
27 The effect of authoritarianism in the ASES would disappear completely if Singapore were classified as an 
authoritarian regime. It is coded by Polity at -2; the cutoff I used was -5. 41 
 
Table 9:  Correlates of fear 
        A. EB2000 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
         
     
           
Predominantly Catholic  .34  .13  .25  .27 
 
.31 
           
     
(.28)  (.23)  (.31)  (.29)  (.42) 
























           
       
       



















       
                   
Years of war 
     
  .10     
 
         
       
  (.06)     
            Log GDP per capita  
   
    -.78   
            previous year 
   
    (.65)   
                                       
School: take notes 
         
-.06 
(1.71)             
                           
School: feel awkward 
         
.02 
(.06)             
                            Masculinity 
   
        .002 
         
       
        (.003) 
          Uncertainty avoidance 
 
        -.000 
         
       
        (.003) 
                                      Secular-Rational 
   
       
 
-.16* 
   
-.14* 
 
       
       
 
(.07) 
   
(.07) 
  Self-Expression 
   
       
 
-.10 
       
       
       
 
(.17) 
       
       
       
            Belief in Hell 
   
       
   
1.01 
   
.76*** 
       
       
   
(.84) 
   
(.17) 
Belief in Heaven 
   
       
   
-.25 
     
       
       
   
(.78) 
      TV use 
     
       
     
-.85  -.56  -.84** 
       
       
     
(.54)  (.34)  (.29) 
State share in TV 
   
       
     
-.05 
   
       
       
     
(.37) 
    Constant 
   
-.42*  -.42*  -.42*  7.63  -.69  -.45**  -.13  -.51***  3.53  2.27  3.25** 
     
(.21)  (.22)  (.22)  (6.69)  (.51)  (.17)  (.21)  (.14)  (2.43)  (1.51)  (1.30) 
R2 
   
.2050  .7231  .3049  .4618  .2645  .7868  .8018  .8135  .7711  .8174  .8720 
N        17  17  16  15  15  16  17  17  16  17  17 
 
   42 
 
Table 9:  (Continued) 
      B. EB2002 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
       
             
  Predominantly Catholic  .52  .35  .43  .48  .44  .38  .12  .10  .29 
     
(.31)  (.30)  (.35)  (.33)  (.43)  (.32)  (.24)  (.32)  (.36) 
                            Predominantly Protestant  .32  .20  .25  .05  .24  .01  .21  .00  .20 
     
(.28)  (.29)  (.30)  (.30)  (.30)  (.33)  (.22)  (.31)  (.31) 
                            Predominantly Orthodox  1.29***  .61*  .89**  1.00**  1.12**  .68*  .60**  .12  .54 
     
(.25)  (.32)  (.35)  (.34)  (.41)  (.37)  (.21)  (.39)  (.59) 
       
               
Authoritarian episode 
   
.68***        .83***  .49**  .71***  .68** 
       
(.19)        (.23)  (.19)  (.16)  (.24) 
Years of war 
     
  .10             
       
  (.06)             
Log GDP per capita  
   
    -.70           
previous year 
   
    (.57)           
                       
School: take notes              .74         
              (1.60)         
School: feel awkward              -.01         
       
      (.06)         
Masculinity 
   
        .001       
       
        (.005)       
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
        -.004       
       
        (.004)       
       
               
Secular-Rational 
   
          -.22**     
       
          (.09)     
Self-Expression 
   
          -.23     
       
          (.19)     
       
               
Belief in Hell 
   
            2.10*   
       
            (.99)   
Belief in Heaven 
   
            -1.00   
       
            (.87)   
TV use 
     
              -.46 
       
              (1.00) 
State share in TV 
   
              -.19 
       
              (1.08) 
Constant 
   
-.57**  -.57**  -.57*  6.66  -.59  -.34  -.07  -.50  1.63 
     
(.25)  (.26)  (.26)  (5.86)  (.51)  (.42)  (.29)  (34)  (4.43) 
R2 
   
.3452  .6453  .4346  .5132  .3873  .7242  .7790  .8102  .6608 
N        17  17  16  15  15  16  17  17  16 
 
   43 
 
Table 9:  (Continued) 
      C. EB2005 
     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
       
     
            Predominantly Catholic  .17  .18  .16  .22*  .00  .17  .18  .12  .34  .15 
     
(.15)  (.14)  (.15)  (.12)  (.19)  (.11)  (.14)  (.10)  (.21)  (.11) 
                            Predominantly Protestant  -.23  -.17  -.26  -.18  -.22  -.11  -.15  -.13  -.16  -.18 
     
(.16)  (.15)  (.17)  (.15)  (.18)  (.17)  (.15)  (.11)  (.17)  (.13) 
                            Predominantly Orthodox  .57***  .58***  .56**  .63***  .40**  .48***  .63***  .39***  .98***  .56*** 
     
(.13)  (.13)  (.21)  (.10)  (.17)  (.16)  (.09)  (.11)  (.23)  (.11) 
       
       
       
 
Authoritarian episode 
   
.12       
       
 
       
(.10)       
       
 
Years of war 
     
  .00     
       
 
       
  (.04)     
       
 
Log GDP per capita  
   
    -.29**    -.27**  -.12  -.06  -1.08   
previous year 
   
    (.12)    (.12)  (.16)  (.12)  (.63)   
                         
School: take notes              .79           
              (.71)           
School: feel awkward              -.00           
       
      (.02) 
       
 
Masculinity 
   
        -.000 
     
 
       
        (.002) 




        .003 
     
 
       
        (.003) 
     
 
       
       
       
 
Secular-Rational 
   
       
 
-.04 
   
 
       
       
 
(.07) 
   
 
Self-Expression 
   
       
 
-.10 
   
 
       
       
 
(.08) 
   
 
       
       
       
 
Belief in Hell 
   
       




       
       




Belief in Heaven 
   
       




       
       





     
       
     
.58   
       
       
     
(.89)   
State share in TV 
   
       
     
.97*  .44 
       
       
     
(.43)  (.29) 
Constant 
   
-.41***  -.48***  -.41***  2.50*  -.63*  2.09  .87  .28  7.31  -.51*** 
     
(.13)  (.13)  (.14)  (1.20)  (.30)  (1.33)  (1.57)  (1.25)  (7.67)  (.14) 
R2 
   
.4456  .4802  .4583  .6066  .4545  .5901  .5920  .7210  .7467  .7267 
N        27  27  26  25  19  24  23  24  14  23 
   44 
 
Table 9:  (Continued) 
      D.  AASES     
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
       
     
       
   
Predominantly Catholic  .11  .11  .10  .16  -.38 
     
   
     
(.34)  (.32)  (.29)  (.32)  (.30) 
     
   











(.51)           
                            Predominantly Orthodox  1.27***  1.06***  1.34***  1.35***  1.06**  .62***  1.24***  1.13***  1.38***  .73*** 
     
(.20)  (.20)  (.24)  (.25)  (.31)  (.19)  (.17)  (.18)  (.11)  (.18) 
                            Predominantly Muslim  .04  -.17  -.65*  -.37  n.a.  -.80**  -.82*  -.82*  -.48  -.76** 
     
(.20)  (.20)  (.35)  (.42)    (.28)  (.42)  (.43)  (.43)  (.30) 
       
                 
Authoritarian episode 
   
.42                 
       
(.32)                 
Years of war 
     
  .02*      .03***  .03*  .03  .03**  .03*** 
       
  (.01)      (.01)  (.02)  (.02)  (.01)  (.01) 
Log GDP per capita  
   
    -.30             
previous year 
   
    (.28)             
       
                 
School: take notes            -1.26           
            (1.77)           
School: feel awkward            .05           
            (.06)           
Masculinity 
   
        .002         
       
        (.005)         
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
        .014***        .013*** 
       
        (.003)        (.003) 
       
                 
Secular-Rational 
   
          .17       
       
          (.20)       
Self-Expression 
   
          .05       
       
          (.23)       
       
                 
Belief in Hell 
   
            1.75     
       
            (1.73)     
Belief in Heaven 
   
            -2.70**     
       
            (1.16)     
National media use 
   
              1.56**  .54 
       
              (.57)  (.38) 
Constant 
   
-.13  -.34  -.28  2.78  -.01  -1.32***  -.39  .45  -4.02**  -2.42** 
     
(.20)  (.32)  (.26)  (2.65)  (.76)  (.36)  (.25)  (.38)  (1.39)  (.81) 
R2 
   
0.3146  .4244  .4745  .4287  .7603  .8018  .5920  .5920  .5923  .8147 
N        18  18  18  18  11  18  15  15  18  18 
Sources: See Appendix Table A1. 
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Controlling  for  religious  tradition,  the  effect  of  economic  development  was  not  usually 
statistically significant. The exception was some models for EB2005; it might be that the relatively 
lower  income  of  the  East  European  and  Southern  European  islands  (Cyprus  and  Malta)  helps 
explain  their  higher  fear  levels.  The  measures  of  educational  style  were  never  significant  and 
sometimes had the ―wrong‖ signs. The results for media environment were unclear. In some cases, 
watching television news more regularly was associated with lower fear, but in ASES attention to 
the national media correlated with higher fear. State control of television did not have a consistent 
effect. 
Disentangling  the  effects  of  values  is  obviously  tricky.  The  ―masculinity‖  of  a  country‘s 
culture  was  never  significantly  associated  with  fearfulness,  controlling  for  religious  tradition. 
Somewhat surprisingly given the close conceptual connection, uncertainty avoidance only showed up 
as significant in one survey, the ASES. In this case, including uncertainty avoidance caused a sharp 
drop in the coefficient on Orthodox Christianity. It is possible that in this case uncertainty avoidance 
is picking up some aspect of differences in religious traditions. Inglehart‘s self-expression vs. survival 
dimension was never significant, controlling for religious traditions. Secular rational vs. tradition 
values did correlate with lower fear in the Western European surveys, but this was not significant in 
the broader samples.  
The most consistent finding on values was a positive relationship between belief in Hell and 
higher fear, and sometimes a negative relationship with belief in Heaven. In Western Europe, the 
highest  levels  of  belief  in  Hell  were  found  in  Greece,  Italy,  and  Ireland  (where  this  belief  was 
leavened  by  an  even  stronger  belief  in  Heaven).  Adding  in  the  newer  EU  members,  the  group 
includes Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Malta. Including belief in Hell and Heaven in regressions 
usually  reduced  the  estimated  impact  of  religious  tradition.28 This  was  also  true  for  regressions 
including the predominant religion variables in the EB2000 survey (not shown). This is consistent 
with the notion that the beliefs about divine retribution that different religions propagate affect the 
                                                           
28 Belief in Hell is higher in Greece than in most other West European countries (41 percent), not because 
Orthodox Christians have a higher rate of belief in Hell than for instance, Catholics (they do not), but because 
the proportion of Greeks who are religious is very high (96 percent) even relative to that in predominantly 
Catholic countries like Italy (82 percent).  46 
 
degree  of  fearfulness  in  countries  whose  cultures  were  shaped  by  these  religions.  To  illustrate, 
Figure 4 plots the EB2005 fear score against the percentage of country residents that in 2000 said 





7   Conclusion 
Reported  fear  of  major  dangers  varies  across  countries  in  quite  consistent  ways.  I  constructed 
indexes of feafulness using data from four surveys taken between 2000 and 2005. Within Europe, the 
highest levels of fear were found in a number of Mediterranean countries—Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus, Malta—followed by some of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, while 





























































Proportion of population that believed in Hell, 2000 
Figure 4:   Belief in Hell and Fear, 2005 
Sources: World Values  Survey, 2000, as in Barro Dataset on Religion; author's calculations using EB2005. Correlation: r = .54.  47 
 
consistent subnational variation in reported fear. About two thirds of the crossnational variation 
within  Europe  can  be  explained  by  differences  in  a  measure  of  pessimism—the  degree  to  which 
respondents  exaggerate  the  likelihood  of  unpleasant  outcomes.  Countries  where  people  are  more 
fearful tend to be those in which people are more distrustful—of national authorities or other people 
in general—but more distrustful individuals are only slightly, if at all, more fearful.  
  Available data did not permit strong conclusions about why fear is more widespread in some 
countries than others. However, certain conjectures fit the evidence better than others. Fearfulness 
correlated  relatively  robustly  with  the  dominant  religious  tradition  and  with  the  proportions  of 
citizens  who  believed  in  Heaven  (negatively)  and  in  Hell  (positively).  Recent  authoritarian 
government might increase fear in Western Europe, and experience of war might do the same in 
Asia, but this is less clear. Of course, there is no guarantee that the patterns noted  here would 
remain in more comprehensive or more recent data; definitive answers must await more detailed 
surveys. Still, the relationships reviewed in this paper support the view that important aspects of 
the quality of life vary across countries in ways that are not captured by differences in per capita 
income. Mapping the ―emotional climates‖ of the world—and explaining their origins—remains an 
important challenge for social scientists.   
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Fear of bodily injury illness and death, 1990s 
Figure A1:  Fear of bodily injury, illness, and death, 1990s (Arrindell 
et al. 2004) and Eurobarometer 2000 fear score  
Sources: Arrindell et al. (2004); Eurobarometer 2000 survey (ICPSR); author's calculations. 


















































Fear of bodily injury illness and death, 1990s 
Figure A2: Fear of bodily injury, illness, and death, 1990s (Arrindell 
et al. 2004) and Eurobarometer 2002 fear score  
Sources: Arrindell et al. (2004); Eurobarometer 2002 survey (ICPSR); author's calculations. 
















































Fear of bodily injury illness and death, 1990s 
Figure A3. Fear of bodily injury, illness, and death, 1990s (Arrindell 
et al. 2004) and Eurobarometer 2005 fear score  
Sources: Arrindell et al. (2004); Eurobarometer 2005 survey (ICPSR); author's calculations. 





















































Fear of bodily injury illness and death, 1990s 
Figure A4. Fear of bodily injury, illness, and death, 1990s (Arrindell et 
al. 2004) and Asia Europe Survey 2001 fear score  
Sources: Arrindell et al. (2004); Asia Europe Survey 2001 (ICPSR); author's calculations. 



















































Expressivity score (Matsumoto et al., 2008) 
Figure A5:  Do cultural norms against expressing emotions explain 
low fear scores? Eurobarometer 2005 
Sources: Matsumoto et al. (2008); Eurobarometer 2005 survey (ICPSR); author's calculations. Correlation: r 








Japan  South Korea 































Expressivity score (Matsumoto et al., 2008) 
Sources: Matsumoto et al. (2008); ASES 2001 survey (ICPSR); author's calculations. Correlation: r = -
.11 
Figure A6:  Do cultural norms against expressing emotions explain 

















































































Ln of number of deaths and injuries caused by terrorism per million 
people, 1995-1999 
Figure A7:  Terrorism, fear and objective danger 
Source: RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, downloaded Sept 16, 2010, 
www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/; Eurobarometer 2000 (ICPSR). Correlation: r = .35.  


























































































































Ln number of cases of BSE in farmed cattle reported 1989-2004 
Figure A8:  "Mad cow disease," fear and objective danger 
Sources: World Organization for Animal Health, www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esbmonde.htm.; Eurobarometer 2005 
(ICPSR); one added to number of cases of BSE before taking logs.  Correlation: r = -.05 







































































































Percentage of respondents who said they or family member had suffered 
serious medical error 
Figure A9:  Medical errors, fear and objective danger 




Table A1:  Variable definitions and sources 
Variable   Definition  Source 
EB2000 (zslong, 
zshort) 
Index of fear, EB2000  Author‘s calculations, from:  Hartung, Harald. 
Eurobarometer 54.1: Bulidng Europe and the 
European Union, The European Parliament, Public 
Safety, and Defense Policy, November-December 
2000 [Computer file] (ICPSR03209-v4. Conducted 
by European Opinion 
Research Group EEIG, Brussels. 2nd ZA ed. 
Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung [producer], 2008. Cologne, 
Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: 





Index of fear, EB2002  Author‘s calculations, from: Christensen, Thomas. 
Eurobarometer 57.1: European Union Enlargement, 
the European Parliament, and the Euro, March-May 
2002 
[Computer file] (ICPSR03521-v2. Cologne, 
Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 







Germany  GB 

























































































































Ln cases of swine flu (H1N1) reported per 100 million people 
Figure A10:  Swine flu, fear and objective danger  
Sources: Pew GAP Survey 2009; WHO "Weekly epidemiological record" 15 May 2009, 
www.who.int/wer/2009/wer8420.pdf; one added to number of cases of BSE before taking logs.   
Note: Correlation: r = -.58 58 
 
[distributors], 2007-02-12. doi:10.3886/ICPSR03521) 
EB2005 (zslong, 
zshort) 
Index of fear, EB2005  Author‘s calculations, from: Papacostas, Antonis. 
Eurobarometer 64.1: Mobility, Food Risk, Smoking, 
AIDS Prevention, and Medical Errors, September-
October 2005 [Computer file] (ICPSR04641-v2. 
Cologne, Germany: GESIS/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social 




Index of fear, ASES  Author‘s calculations, from: Inoguchi, Takashi. Asia 
Europe Survey (ASES): A Multinational 
Comparative Study in 18 Countries, 2001 
[Computer file] (ICPSR22324-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium of Political 
and Social Research [distributor], 2008-06-24, 
doi:10.3886/ICPSR22324) 
Arrindell index  Fear of bodily injury, illness, and 
death, 1990s 
Arrindell et al. (2004) 
Matsumoto index  Expressivity score   Matsumoto et al. (2008) 
Ln terrorism  Natural log of number of deaths and 
injuries caused by terrorism per 
million people, 1995-1999; 2000-04.  
 
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, 
downloaded Sept 16, 2010, 
www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/. 
Ln BSE  Natural log of number of cases of 
BSE in farmed cattle reported 1989-
2004 
 
World Organization for Animal Health, 
www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esbmonde.htm downloaded 
Oct 1, 2010. 
Ln Swine Flu  Natural log of number of cases of 
swine flu (H1N1) reported per 100 
million people 
 
WHO "Weekly epidemiological record" 15 May 2009, 
http://www.who.int/wer/2009/wer8420.pdf 
Crime  Sum of 5-year prevalence 
victimisation rates for burglary, 
attempted burglary, robbery, theft 
of personal property, sexual offence 
against women and assaults and 
threats (2005 or closest year) 
Jan van Dijk, John van Kesteren, and Paul Smit, 
Criminal Victimisation in International Perspective, 




     
Car accidents  estimated road traffic death rate 
per 100,000 people, 2007 
WHO Global status report on road safety, 2009, 
downloaded sept 17, 2010, 
www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safet
y_status/data/table_a2.pdf 
Masculinity  Extent to which men have values 
different from those of women—
assertive and competive as opposed 
to modest and caring.  
Geert Hofstede cultural dimensions data, 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--




Extent to which people feel 
uncomfortable in unstructured 
situations 
Geert Hofstede cultural dimensions data, 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--




Extent to which societal values 
emphasize economic and physical 
security rather than subjective well-
being, self-expression and quality of 
life. 
World Values Survey website, 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_pub




Extent to which societal values 
emphasize  importance of religion, 
deference to authority, parent-child 
ties, and trraditional standards 
World Values Survey website, 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_pub
lished/article_base_54, downloaded October 20, 
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relating to family life.   
School: take notes  Percent of 8th grade maths students 
saying ―all the time,‖ in answer to: 
―In schools, how often 
do you do these things? Copy notes 
from the board during the lessons?‖  
Trends in International Mathematics and Science 




Percent of 15-year-olds who say 
they ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ 
when asked: ―In general, do you feel 
awkward in your class?‖  
Program for International Student 
Assessment, 2000 and 2003, as in dataset for Algan, 
Cahuc and Shleifer (2010) 
Generalized trust  Percent saying most people could be 
trusted. 
World Values Survey website, 
www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp, 
downoladed January 20, 2011, data for 2000 wave 
Predominantly XXX  More than 50% of population 
adherents of XXX, 2000,  
Robert Barro Religion Adherence Dataset 
(http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/da
ta_sets_barro), from Barrett, D.B., G.T. Kurian, and 
T.M. Johnson (2001). World Christian Encyclopedia, 
2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Believes in Hell  % of country respondents who say 
they believe in Hell 
World Values Survey, 1999-2000, as in Robert 
Barro Religion Adherence Dataset 
(http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/da
ta_sets_barro), 
Believes in Heaven  % of country respondents who say 
they believe in Heaven 
World Values Survey, 1999-2000, as in Robert 
Barro Religion Adherence Dataset 
(http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/da
ta_sets_barro), 
Gdp per capita PPP  Real GDP per capita (Constant 
Prices: Chain series) 
Penn World Tables 63.  
FH unfree press  Index of restrictions on press 
freedom, average for years from 
1994 to survey year or t-1 if n.a. 
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press Scores, 
downloaded Oct 15, 2010.  
TV use  Average answer to ―How often do 
you watch the news on tv‖ where 5 




Average answer to ―How often do 
you follow accounts of political or 
governmental affairs in a national 
newspaper, magazine, radio, or 
Television?‖ where 3 = regularly, 1 
= never 
ASES 
State share TV  Share of the audience of the top 5 
television stations that is accounted 
for by state-owned television 
stations 
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana 
Nenova and Andrei Shleifer. "Who Owns The 
Media?," Journal of Law and Economics, 2003, 
v46(2,Oct), 341-382. 
War years  Number of years between 1960 and 
survey date in which at least 25 
battle-related deaths occurred 
associated with use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at 
least one was the government of a 
state. 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4, 
2009,downloaded October 20, 2010; see Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, 
Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand, ‗‗Armed 
Conflict 1946 to 2001: A New Dataset,‘‘ Journal of 
Peace Research 39 (2002): 615-37. 
Authoritarian 
episode since 1960 
At least one year in which country‘s 
Polity2 score was less than -5. 
Polity IV dataset, 2009. 
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crime  Epidemics 
France  15  7  4  -1  -4  -1  -3  6  -2  -13 
Belgium  5  -1  -7  -9  -16  -7  -13  -2  -8  -10 
Netherlands  2  1  -3  -9  -19  0  -10  -4  -16  -3 
W. Germany  3  0  -3  -10  -14  0  -10  8  -8  -11 
Italy  16  6  9  0  -9  10  -9  9  -1  -3 
Luxembourg  6  -8  -5  -8  -4  1  -3  -1  -7  -6 
Denmark  3  -3  -2  -3  -13  4  -6  6  -14  -5 
Ireland  4  4  -1  5  4  4  -7  5  -4  -8 
Britain  8  6  0  -4  -9  0  -5  1  -7  -5 
N. Ireland  1  -6  -9  -8  -1  5  -3  -9  -4  -2 
Greece  2  1  2  -1  -5  -3  -5  0  -5  1 
Spain  -1  -3  -6  -5  -9  -3  -4  -1  1  -12 
Portugal  -5  -4  -6  -5  -7  -7  -9  -4  -4  -9 
E. Germany  -3  -7  -5  -13  -15  -4  -6  2  -10  -14 
Finland  3  -1  -3  0  -15  13  -9  0  -8  -15 
Sweden  -1  -4  -12  -6  -20  0  -16  -4  -16  -14 
Austria  -6  -9  -10  -6  -15  -7  -13  2  -14  -9 
                     
Average  3  -1  -3  -5  -10  0  -8  1  -7  -8 
Sources: Author‘s calculations from EB2000 and EB2002. 
 